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Abstract
We are living today the so called “Digital Revolution” that started 50 years ago. Younger generations are
forcing the transportation industry to move towards social, connected, environment-friendly, assisted
means of transport. The intelligent, fully-digitized autonomous vehicle is an evolutionary process that
starts right into the connected vehicle. But such complex system is becomingmore andmore vulnerable
to external cyber attacks as it increases its connectivity capabilities. However, the Groupe Renault, the
world’s leading French vehicle-manufacturer, is ready to confront these challenges. This project focuses
on the design, implementation and automation of a variety of test cases aiming to partially validate the
embedded software running on the IVC, the on-board modem that provides Internet accessibility to
connected vehicles. Both cybersecurity and performance aspects will be considered, a series of results
will be presented and analyzed, and some relevant conclusions will be eventually drawn.
This project is part of the Dual Degree Program arranged between the UPC-ETSETB –based in
Barcelona and specialized in Telecommunications, and ISAE-SUPAERO –based in Toulouse and
specialized in Aeronautics and Space, two of the best European Engineering Schools. It was carried
out at Renault Software Labs, a fully-owned subsidiary of the Groupe Renault, based in Toulouse,
France.
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Project context
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The new digital revolution: towards connected vehicles
We are living today the so called "Digital Revolution" that started over 50 years ago. Anatural evolution process that once started with the shift frommechanical and analogueelectronic devices towards digital systems. We first witnessed the expansion of the dot-
com websites in the 1990s and its subsequent bubble in the 2000s. We also gave testimony to the
later triumph and development of mobile devices with the pioneer arrivals of the BlackBerry, released
in 1999, and the widescreen iPhone, released in 2007. It then started the unstoppable smartphone
industry revolution towards the socialization of digital telephony that we can find at present-day. The
“digital world” as a whole is changing the way we interact with each other as a society, and forcing
every business to rapidly innovate and adapt to the fast changing work market where both outdated
professionals and enterprises are left apart to die alone or to be eaten by huge digital multinationals.
It is now when Google, Amazon and Facebook are being the target of an exhausted scrutiny on the
part of the competent authorities that suggest the possible existence of a technological monopoly [1].
Leaving the controversy regarding honest competition aside, we observe how there is clearly a lack
of digital transformation in something that affects us daily: transportation. Younger generations are
forcing the transportation industry to move towards social, connected, environment-friendly means
of transport. Electric and hybrid vehicles are a reality and are here to stay. Global warming is certain
and without the required changes towards a digital transformation, the automobile industry will cease
to exist. Websites in the late 1990s. Smartphones in the late 2010s. Smartcars in the late 2020s. It is the
natural process of digital transformation, and the Groupe Renault1 is trying to push it hard in order to
offer a wide range of vehicles that introduce both eco-friendly engines and connected services. We say
that the intelligent vehicle, or smartcar, is an evolutionary process that is composed by several phases,
starting from the connected vehicle until the arrival of the autonomous vehicle.
The initial step consists of a vehicle that connects via the Internet to different servers in order to offer
an ample range of services or actions, from remotely opening the door –the so called Remote Lock
Unlock (RLU) to on-board computer control by voice. It also offers a full range of infotainment
systems, optimized driving modes to obtain the lowest possible fuel consumption and battery-life
1Name in French. Similarly, it is also known by the name of "Renault Group", in English
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maximization based on the driver driving skills and habits, map directions depending on current traffic,
among others. Alongside with the services we find the Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS)
functionalities that increase the benefits of connected vehicles at the expense of adding an additional
layer of complexity to the vehicle’s embedded software. These driving assistance systems are based on a
scale of 0 to 5, where 0 represents the normal vehicle, isolated from other systems and devices with no
driving automation, and 5 represents the fully autonomous driving car [2]. Such intelligent vehicle
represents the last step of digital evolution within the automobile industry; an entirely connected
vehicle able to manage both internal and external communication networks whose only one target is
to achieve the highest value in comfort, kindness to the environment, and security.
Fig. 1.1 Renault vehicles
One of the two halves that are key to achieving success in the car digital transformation is the inter-
communication network. It lies between vehicles and environment devices and is directly based on
the upcoming Fifth Generation (5G) technology. This 5G standard will bring a peak data rate of
20 Gbit/s, user experienced data rate of 100 Mbit/s, mobility of up to 500 km/h, 1 ms latency, and
many further benefits [3]. The inter-communication network will allow efficient traffic management,
drastically reducing traffic jams and deaths. Nearly 1.3 million people die in road crashes every year,
and over 50 million result injured and/or disabled [4]. Around 90% of road accidents are attributable
to driver error [5]. If the vehicle precisely knows the position of other vehicles at any moment under
any circumstances, intelligent synchronization techniques shall apply and no more round-abouts,
traffic-lights, or any other human coordination techniques are to be required. We know that car jams
are caused by the human being and his inability to manage high density traffic situations, for they
have slow reaction times and short attention spans. Therefore, self-driving cars are a structurally
systematized solution that increase traffic throughput. Besides, other probable outcomes are to apply:
no car blockages will result into smaller commuting times, augmenting the spreading surface of cities
and allowing higher commuting distances, autonomous driving will spare the necessity of parking
slots in the city centers, plus increasing the number of potential customers that do not have a driving
license, just to name but a few. However, safety and the price of required investments are the main
obstacles to the growth of such intelligent transportation systems [6]. It is clear that current roadside
infrastructures are not ready to cope with the outstanding growth of connected vehicles. They are
not ready to confront all required entities to carry out experimental testing. There is nowadays a lack
of connected devices that allow data gathering and processing related to traffic, comfort and safety,
enabling data sharing to transportation systems. Fortunately, those connected objects are soon to
[3]
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come and they will bring connected vehicles into reality thanks to the Internet of Things (IoT). Thus,
a smart grid framework will be implemented. As a matter of fact, connected technologies will result
in structural changes in the automotive industry. They will modify the sales process by bundling
connected services and features at the point of sale. As a result, they will account for at least a figure of
20% of automotive sales by 2025 [7].
The other half is the so-called intra-vehicle communication network, relying entirely into an internal
structure, or Controller Area Network (CAN) network. It allows excellent synchronization between
all available Engine Control Unit (ECU) at the vehicle’s on-board computer and enables data sharing
between all embedded systems, such as the camera, laser, lidar, and so forth. As a general idea, the
multimedia car system is also connected to this network. It is composed of both the In-Vehicle
Infotainment (IVI) and the In-Vehicle Communication (IVC); the IVI carries out the core functions,
processing data and displaying it to the user, while the IVC is fundamentally the car’s modem, allowing
external connection and featuring some security functions. As an example of use, the IVC uses its
Third Generation (3G) or Fourth Generation (4G) Radio Frequency (RF) antennas to establish a
connection to the server, enabling a data exchange link that will be used by the IVI to request maps
information to the server and display it to the user once it is downloaded by combining it to the IVC’s
Global Positioning System (GPS) signal. At both internal and external networks, the transmission of
data and the data itself are a major and therefore must be secured and protected at any cost.
1.2 Project objectives
All in all, this document focuses on the simpler type of connected vehicle, the one that is currently
under development and will be sent to production on late 2020 and released on 2021. As previously
mentioned, there is a need of a smartcar that provides an answer to the current market requirements in
terms of connectivity; a minimum number of remote services is mandatory. Based on the concern of
data privacy as a result of the EuropeanGeneralData ProtectionRegulation (GDPR) law implemented
on 25th May 2018, as well as the physical implications of having external data access to the vehicle’s
CAN network –the one that controls the camera and radar but also the engine and break, we must
fully analyze, understand and safeguard the vehicle’s cybersecurity. To do so, there is an exhaustive
mechanism set in place within the Groupe Renault fully-owned Renault Software Labs (RSWL)
company to study and write requirements based on said study, design, implement, and automate
different Test Case (TC)2 in order to validate akin complex embedded system, that will be wholly
presented later on in this document.
More particularly and straightly applied to this project, I will design, implement and automate a variety
of test cases aiming to partially validate the embedded software running on the vehicle’s IVC from both
a cybersecurity point of view and a performance perspective. Consequently, I will require a test bench,
or set up, conforming the required environment that will allow me to initially carry out manual tests
and eventually automate them via the Micro-services Automotive Test Robot Integration eXecutor
(MATRIX), a RSWL proprietary tool that allows you to do so. Such environment will emulate the
IVC’s connection to the Base Station (BS) via the CMW500, a wideband radio communication tester
2I will use both "test case" and TC, its acronym, equally throughout the document
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–or simply "comm tester"3. By using it, I will be able to modify physical parameters such as frequency,
path attenuation, transmission power, to name but a few, at will. Besides, I will connect the comm
tester to a real Internet connection so we can link the IVC to VNEXT, the Groupe Renault server
providing remote services –further described on Chapter 2.2.3. The whole setup will serve as basis
to deal with real systems in real circumstances. I will try to take the system4 beyond its limits and, if
possible, find possible bugs. To do that, I will use several computers to carry out simple attacks and
sniff network data traffic. Thanks to the ulterior use of automated test cases, I will be ready to add
another brick into the validation building that is the connected vehicle. Initial simple but powerful
test cases related to cybersecurity will allow me to partially certify the vehicle’s modem is protected.
During this validation process, I will analyze the embedded software, and produce code that will be
used in development centers belonging to the Groupe Renault located both in France and abroad.
Thus, the main objectives of this individual project are:
1. Build a test environment –test bench or setup, acknowledge it, and automate it. Further
described in Chapter 4, it is composed of:
(a) A CMW500, or wideband radio communication tester, emulating a network Base Station
(BS).
(b) An In-Vehicle Communication (IVC), the vehicle’s modemproviding network connection
to the car.
(c) An external PC, able to act as an external device within the same network than the vehicle.
(d) A packet sniffer, located in the same network than the car, allowing me to capture any
external digital communication.
2. Analyze the external connectivity of the system, composed of:
(a) A connected car, through its modem, or IVC, that gives it such connectivity and connects
it to the Groupe Renault server, called “VNEXT”, and to the Internet.
(b) A remote server, the so called VNEXT, allowing for remote services and functionalities. It
is ready to accept incoming connections from any previously registered car’s IVC.
3. Analyze both the cybersecurity and performance of the IVC
(a) I will only cover the inter-vehicle network. I will consider the inner intra-vehicle network
secure and thus protected.
(b) I will develop simple manual testing via different tools, such as “OpenSSL”, “Scapy”,
“Wireshark”, and Python libraries for data science. They will be described later on.
(c) Related to performance, I will be using different guidelines and requirements coming
from the Power and Performance (PnP) team at RSWL.
(d) Related to cybersecurity and as "Assistant Engineer in Cybersecurity", I will be using
different guidelines and requirements coming from:
3CMW500, wideband radio communication tester, communication tester, or simply comm tester will be used as
synonyms from now on
4Anywhere in the document, when I say "system" I mean both the IVC and VNEXTworking together
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i. The Groupe Renault cybersecurity experts located at Technocentre Renault (TCR),
the main Research and development (R&D) center in Paris, France.
ii. Previous work from Xavier [8], a former RSWL cybersecurity intern whose work
serves me as fundamental basis to this document.
iii. My research, work and findings.
4. Automate both cybersecurity and performance test cases and integrate them into MA-
TRIX–as shown inChapter 5, confirming it as the definitive automation tool within theGroupe
Renault:
(a) To date, all cybersecurity tests are manually conducted. Thus, full automation will allow
building amore complex testing environment inwhich cybersecurity testwill consequently
increase in complexity. This project represents the initial step towards such purpose.
1.3 Project structure and schedule
This document5 summarizes all work and development I conducted during my "Contrat de profession-
nalisation"6 at RSWL, a 12-month contract allowing me to combine both the student and employee
status7 at the same time. It comes as a result from a collaboration agreement between RSWL and the
Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace, or Higher Institute of Aeronautics and Space, in
English (ISAE-SUPAERO), my Engineering School in France. During my last year of studies, I was
given the opportunity to benefit from two different calendars:
• From September 2018 to March 2019, I attended classes fromMonday toWednesday. I chose
data science andArtificial Intelligence (AI) asmymajor, so I could learn aboutMachine Learning
(ML) and Reinforcement Learning (ML) algorithms and techniques. In parallel, I was enrolled
into a school project based on developing a Capture The Flag (CTF) in AI8. Both Thursdays
and Fridays I attended RSWL to work on this Master’s Thesis project.
• From April 2019 to August 2019, I fully attend9 RSWL as a software developer. My official
status is "Assistant Engineer in Cybersecurity", or "Apprenti Ingénieur" in French.
Choosing a software company specialized in embedded software to carry out my final engineering
project was a thoughtful idea I considered carefully. As an international dual degree student attending
two different engineering schools under a collaboration agreement, I wanted to work on a project
that would jointly serve as basis for both institutions. The connected vehicle represents a complex
system that brings two different concepts together. On the one hand we have the telecommunications
5Written in LATEXso images can be zoom in without bearing bad resolution. Besides, any reference included in this
document has an hyperlink to its source.
6Also known as "Contrat d’apprentissage" in French, but the latter usually lasts 3 years instead of 1. It is similar to an
extended-in-time internship but bearing the dual status of student-employee
7Therefore this project is entirely based on product development and not in research.
8The website may be consulted at https://wait-ctf.com/
9To date, July 2019, I’m still working on the project
[6]
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perspective. Connected means networks, protocols, and Radio Frequency (RF) communications.
It perfectly suits the Escola Tècnica Superior d’Enginyeria de Telecomunicacions de Barcelona, or
Barcelona School of Telecommunications Engineering, in English (ETSETB)10, my Engineering School
in Spain where I attend the "Master’s Degree in Telecommunications Engineering (MSc)" program.
On the other hand we have the transportation perspective. Vehicle means mobility and embedded
software. They are two of the most important topics covered at ISAE-SUPAERO, my Engineering
School in France where I attend the "Ingénieur ISAE-SUPAERO (MSc)" program. It is well known
that nowadays transportation systems rely entirely on intelligent embedded software that efficiently
manages all different scenarios. This Dual Degree Master’s Thesis represents the ultimate stage of an
international collaborative engineering program allowing students to learn and love engineering from
two different but complementary points of view.
Fig. 1.2 Gantt Chart of the project
This project has 4 main milestones –signaled as a red star in Figure 1.2. Basically, the start and the end
of the project, as well as the presentation of my obtained results before the experts of the Groupe
Renault. Additionally I decided to include an external milestone referring to the school project that I
attended at the same time than this project as complementary information –in dark blue. Besides, the
Gantt Chart shows how I made slow progress during the first half of the calendar, for I was attending
RSWL only two days a week.
10School belonging to the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, or Technical University of Catalonia, in English (UPC)
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Chapter 2
Renault and connected vehicles
2.1 About Renault
2.1.1 The Groupe Renault and the Alliance
TheGroupe Renault, a carmaker founded in 1898, is an international multi-brand group thatbrings together the Renault, Dacia, Renault SamsungMotors (RSM), Alpine and LADAlines. It is present in 134 countries and sold over 3,9 million vehicles in 2018. Besides, its
revenue in 2017 was 58,7k M€, with a net income of 5,2k M€ and a workforce of over 181k employees.
To date, it is the world’s leading French vehicle-manufacturer [9]. Groupe Renault means "one group,
five brands". More precisely:
Fig. 2.1 One group, five brands
• Renault, with over 2,6M vehicles sold in 2017, is leader of the European electric vehicle market.
• Dacia, with over 655k vehicles sold in 2017, it offers a wide range of simple and reliable vehicles
at affordable prices.
• Renault Samsung Motors (RSM), with almost 100k vehicles sold in 2017, is one of the top
five carmakers in South Korea, particularly reputed for its service quality.
• Lada, with over 335k vehicles sold in 2017, became a Groupe Renault brand in January 2017. It
is the long-standing leader of the Russian market.
[8]
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• Alpine, founded in 1955, was back to production in 2017 with the new Alpine A110 reflecting
lightweight, compactness, and agility.
The Groupe Renault main targets are (1) becoming the leader in electric vehicles with over 8 electric
models and 12 electrified models1, and (2) achieving 100% connected vehicles in key markets and 15
autonomous Renault services. Besides, 21 new models will be released in the upcoming 5 years –from
2017 to 2022. Some further information released on January 2019 [10]:
• In Europe, registrations were stable (+0.5%) in a market that grew by 0.2%. The Group’s growth
comes mainly from the B segment (Clio, Captur, Sandero), and NewDuster. Clio remains the
second best-selling vehicle in Europe and Captur the first crossover in its class.
• In Renault brand’s electric vehicle segment, sales increased by 37% over the year, with an acceler-
ation in the second half (+62%). Renault is the European leader with a 22%market share.
However, the Groupe Renault does not walk alone. It constitutes one of the three entities composing
theRenault-Nissan-Mitsubishi (RNM)Alliance2. SuchAlliance is themost sustainable andproductive
multi-cultural strategic collaboration in the global automobile industry. It is in fact the world’s leading
automotive alliance. Founded in 1999, it offers an unique, pragmatic, agile model of design and
production, being always ready to evolve and integrate new projects and partners.
The Alliance sold over 10,76 M vehicles in 2018 in 200 markets worldwide, becoming the world’s top 1
car seller in the world3. Some keys [11]:
• Over 10,76M vehicles sold in 2018, meaning 1 in 9 vehicles sold worldwide
• Over 775k electric vehicles sold
• Over 450k employees worldwide
• 122 manufacturing plants
Among the multiple benefits from the RNMAlliance, we highlight the following:
1. 80% of the Groupe Renault produced on shared CommonModule Family (CMF) platforms.
2. 4,2k M€ in savings thanks to common at both investments and R&D levels.
3. 18 k M€ invested in R&D by the Groupe Renault, giving access to a portfolio of technologies
worth 50kM€.
The Alliance targets zero-emission, connected, autonomous, affordable mobility. In order to achieve
those goals, the Groupe Renault acquired Renault Software Labs (RSWL) in 2017.
1Electric models are the reason number 1 behind the Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) merge proposal to Renault in
2019. Besides, factories remain little automated.
2Renault owns 43,4% of Nissan. Nissan owns 15% of Renault. Nissan owns 34% of Mitsubishi Motors. The Alliance
board is equally composed at 50-50 by Renault and Nissan.
3(1) RNMAlliance: 10,76M, (2) Volkswagen Group: 10,62 M, (3) Toyota: 10,39 M, (4) General Motors: 8,38 M, (5)
Hyundai-KIA: 7,29, (6) Ford: 5,98 M, (7) Honda: 5,25 M, (8) Fiat-Chrysler: 4,84 M, (9) PSA: 3,88 M, (10) Suzuki: 3,33 M.
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2.1.2 Renault Software Labs
Renault Software Labs (RSWL) was born in 2017. The Groupe Renault acquired Intel’s French RD
activities specializing in embedded software, making it a fully-owned subsidiary. It employs over 450
distinguished engineers holding extensive international experience in software development. It is
located on 2 different locations: Toulouse and Sophia-Antipolis. It belonged from 2009 to 2017 to
Intel’s Mobile Communication Group (MCG), a specialised software testing branch of Intel. Such
acquisitionwas a decisivemovement, a strategy implemented targeting excellence in terms of connected
and autonomous vehicle development.
Julien BATTISTON
Head of  Department
Connected Vehicle - Software Business Line
Thierry CAMMAL
Chief  Executive
Renault Software Labs (RSWL)
Olivier CARPENTIER
Head of  Department
Continuous Integration, Tools & Cloud
Denis CHATON
Head of  Department
Quality Assurance, Process & Methods
Christophe CRAPEZ
Head of  Department
Strategic Management
Pascal KHAIR
Head of  Department
Vehicle Platform & Software Architecture 
Benoît RENAULT
Head of  Department
Multimedia & Cockpit
Bruno BOCAERT
Head of  Department
Operations Management
Cédric LE-CLAIRE
Head of  Department
Vehicle Information & Communication
Richard QUINZIO
Head of  Department
Vehicle Architecture & Software PnP
Karl RIELLAND
Head of  Department
Connected Vehicle - Software Integration & Test
Alaeddine ZOUAOUI
Head of  Department
Autonomous Vehicle - Software Platform
Cédric LE-CLAIRE
Head of  Department
Autonomous Vehicle - Algorithms, Control & Fusion
Fig. 2.2 organization chart of RSWL
As can be seen from the Figure 2.2, RSWL is composed of 12 different departments; the 7 on the left
are located on Toulouse premises, and the other 5 on the right located on Sophia-Antipolis premises.
As of January 2018, there were 9 different projects or divisions; this document is entirely based on the
CCAR project, the so called software line –highlighted in Figure 2.2 by a dashed box. The Software
Business Line (SBL) department focuses on the connected car development from a business point
of view, cost analysis, project viability, and so forth, while the Software Integration and Test (SIT)
department focuses on the connected car development from a pure engineering perspective based on
software coding and hardware at a laboratory scale.
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Connected Car
The so called Connected Car (CCAR), main project which I belong, lines up all roadmaps and mile-
stones towards the creation of added value within RSWL. It includes all the software tools that enable
remote development and integration at a global scale, focusing on what brings value to the company:
the low cost vehicle. Its main purpose is to create such a tool that is capable of providing full traceability
and continuous software integration on a weekly basis. In other words, it shall assure the internation-
alization of code development on a regular basis. At an Alliance scale, there is a complete pipeline of
stakeholders where the CCAR represents the last, but not least, part of the sequence. As any other
business, it all starts from the market demands. They are then translated into features assigned to
different squads. After validation, those features are designated to the platform teams that will develop
and consequently deliver solutions based on continuous integration. It allows adding new features
weekly and add value accordingly. After final End-to-end (E2E) validation, those features are ready to
be included into the vehicle’s catalog that will form the different vehicle programs.
Karl RIELLAND
Head of  Department
Connected Vehicle - Software Integration & Test
Thierry CAMMAL
Chief  Executive
Renault Software Labs (RSWL)
Eric MARLOT
Manager
Software Mainline & Test Management
Amaury DE-ROCHEMONTEIX
Manager
Development Framework
Dominique GRANGE
Software Testing Engineer
Luis ORUS GRACIA
Assistant Engineer in Cybersecurity
Fig. 2.3 Organization chart of CCARwhich I belong
2.2 Fundamentals of connected vehicles
As stated in the Oxford Dictionary [12], connected means “brought together or into contact so
that a real or notional link is established”. Thus, connected vehicle means data exchange, or remote
contact, between the vehicle and any other system, such as on-board sensors, roadside infrastructure,
cloud services, other vehicles, and so forth, in order to increase safety, efficiency, and User Experience
(UX). Even though stand-alone internal services and applications such as amazing sound systems or
high-definition screens –see Appendix A, are vital into high-end cars, connectivity is key. Paradise
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remains in the outside world; the extraneous environment lying just one click away. Thus, any current
demanding vehicle must bear a wireless communication. Cars are becoming less transportation and
more entertainment and comfort, both ideas meaning the Internet. In order to keep drawing the
attention of customers, car makers must step forward and bring new functionalities that upscale the
user experience.
When we say connectivity, we refer to wireless mobile telecommunications technologies such as 3G,
4G, and soon-to-come 5G, Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN) technologies such as Bluetooth,
IEEE 802.11 WiFi protocols, and location technologies such as GPS, GLONASS and Galileo. In terms
of added value, navigation is essential. Not only do we mean the underlying RF technology, or the
communications standard, but also the upcoming new features. These are third parties Internet
services within the vehicle’s ecosystem, secured in-carWiFi hotspot, smart antennas, and the promising
soon-to-be 5G. They will all require modifications on the vehicle’s architecture, at both software and
hardware levels; to completely redesign the platform [13]. As previously stated, such connectivity
is achieved by means of two main components: the In-Vehicle Communication (IVC), or vehicle’s
modembearing both aRF and a antennas, and the In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI), anAndroid running
on top of a Linux Operating System (OS). Both IVC and IVI are manufactured by the so called "Tier
1" –an external manufacturer providing such components. For example, the IVC used in this project
was supplied by Continental, a German automotive manufacturing company.
2.2.1 Certificate enrollment
At the Groupe Renault, any connection or data through to the network is protected via the Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI)4, a cryptographic system. Based on the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) X.509 public key certificates standard and, mainly, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
asymmetric encryption cryptosystem. Such asymmetric cryptography uses complex mathematical
operations and algorithms5 to produce an unequivocal key pair assigned to every involved party –i.e.
the sender and the receiver. While in conversation, a sender can use its private key along with the
message to sign6 it and ensure only legit communications and proper authentication. Analogously, a
sender can use the receiver’s public key to encrypt a message and send it through the communications
channel. The recipient, only, will then use its private key to decrypt it. X.509 digital certificates are
an electronic document used to prove the ownership of a public key –or key authentication. We
rely the inter-communications security to a hierarchical architecture relying on a trusted third party
–the "root" Certificate Authority (CA). It is an entity that issues legit digital certificates –a "proof of
authenticity". A digital certificate is like an Identity Document (ID). It is built from a combination
of different variables associated to an entity, such as name, organization, validity period, to name but
a few. By taking all previous information, we can use the private key to compute a hash7 function
–i.e. the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) function, and then obtain a digital signature. Again, it is a
mathematical scheme allowing for verifying the authenticity of a digital document. Any involved party
4Architecture based on a unique pair of public –disseminated widely, and private keys –kept secret and known
exclusively to the key owner.
5Mostly based on the factorization of large prime numbers.
6Signing creates a "digital signature". It is a mathematical function ensuring data integrity, meaning no data was
modified during the communication.
7One-way mathematical function that maps arbitrary-size inputs into fixed-size outputs.
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will subsequently add its own certificate to the message, building the so called "chain of certificates".
For example, if A wants to send a message to B through C, A will form a digital certificate, append
it to the message, and send it to B. Accordingly, B will apply the same procedure and create another
digital certificate, append it to the message and the previously added A’s certificate. C will then receive
a message plus two digital certificates issued by a trusted third-party CA. Thanks to the root CA, C is
now sure it was indeed A and B, and no other external parties trying to spoof the system, the ones that
send and transferred such message.
As it will be later on presented, the Groupe Renault relies on Transport Layer Security (TLS), a very
well-known secure transmission protocol –further presented in Appendix B. Crucial information
such as certificate exchange, supported cryptography algorithms, ciphers, and further configuration
values are shared during the TLS session establishment. The whole system is based on trust. Therefore,
certificates must be entirely unique and secure so no fraud may be found. Certificate enrollment
implies all previous required steps in order to ensure legit certificates at both sides, from the vehicle’s
IVC to VNEXT, the Groupe Renault server. VNEXT acts as the root CA, enabling secure registering
process and providing Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA), remote services, and more. Without an
audited certificate enrollment process, no secure connections can be ever guaranteed. Basically, the
Renault’s PKI goes as follows:
1. The root CA –VNEXT, sends a valid, unique certificate to the supplier –or Tier 1.
2. The Tier 1 then manufactures an IVC, and generates a pair of keys –public and private. It then
stores them into the IVC, sending a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)8 to VNEXT –server
accounted for registering all IVC. It then sends the IVC to the car factory to be introduced into
the vehicle.
3. When received in factory, such IVC is then assigned to an unique Vehicle IdentificationNumber
(VIN). This information is transmitted toVNEXT: both software and hardware are nowbound.
4. After having received the CSR, VNEXT signs the IVC’s digital certificate as root. It then sends
it to the vehicle.
5. Once the mutual authentication is successful, they can communicate to each other in a secure
way –by using TLS.
2.2.2 SOTA/FOTA
Even though we may install the latest functional software, it is doomed to become outdated. It is just
a matter of time. Not only do new features and functionalities require a constant update, but also
working softwaremay drive into problems if the communications ending getsmodified. This inevitably
leads to one of the things the customer fear the most: the planned, or built-in, obsolescence. More
precisely, limited useful life where devices or systems stop working properly and current functionalities
are no longer available. In response, automotive engineers must use the so called software “over-the-air”
to always provide ready-to-use software that is continuously updated over the car’s lifetime. It is not a
8Containing the public key for which the certificate should be issued, identifying information, and the digital signature.
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new technology, for we have been using it every time we updated the software of our smartphone for
updating applications or registering for new online services. More precisely, we use FOTA to remotely
update the firmware, the underlying software –thus Software Over-The-Air (SOTA), that allows low-
level control of specific hardware such as radar, lidar, brakes, cameras, to name but a few. It also enables
the possibility of double check. That is, obtaining an inventory of currently installed software. FOTA
requires a working Subscriber IdentificationModule (SIM) card that identifies and authenticates the
subscriber enabling mobile connectivity. A valid SIM card has many different elements that makes it
unique: Integrated Circuit Card IDentifier (ICCID), International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),
Personal Identification Number (PIN), Personal Unblocking Key (PUK), and a variety of information
related to security authentication, ciphering, temporary data about the local network, and all the
available services.
One of the simplest but at the same time very powerful SIM card functionality is that of awaking the
vehicle. While not in use, the vehicle’s on-board computer is on battery-saving mode. Upon arrival of ,
the whole system leaves the previous mode and activates all systems facilitating full connectivity. This
automatically enables remote services, later introduced at present Chapter. FOTA allows the vehicle
to connect to a server full of contents; it is seen as a centralised system where all important decisions
and processes are managed on the cloud. They allow the so called “update campaigns” where several
patches and enhancements are released and customers are requested to apply and install those changes
by previously downloading it. FOTA services are key to the Groupe Renault, enabling three decisive
remote functionalities. These are:
• Update, allowing customers to obtain the latest released working software product version that
may solve previous bugs and malfunctionalities. It is directly downloaded from the remote
server’s repository.
• Setting, allowing the remote server to enable/disable different available services and benefits
based upon subscription; some of themmay only be applied upon a previous payment.
• Inventory, allowing the remote server to obtain the vehicle’s information related to software
and hardware and compare it to the repository.
Recently, Tesla announced an update campaign where some already available functionalities would
require a new payment subscription [14]. It means that connected vehicles usually come with all neces-
sary hardware to run brand-new upgraded software. However, car manufacturers use SOTA/FOTA
to obtain all information related to the vehicle’s inventory, allowing the user to download new updates
but only enabling those settings if certain requirements were previously met. Remote software may be
triggered after three different reasons: (1) the remote server –VNEXT in Renault, triggers it after a
recent update, (2) in a regular basis previously established by the FOTA team on the development
centers, and (3) on demand. It would be risky otherwise, for external connectivitymay be only activated
if requested by the user. From a cybersecurity point of view, we must avoid unnecessary connections
and reject all input traffic if it was never asked for before. It means that the server will never send, by
its own, unsolicited messages –same goes for you banking provider who will never require you to
transfer your banking credentials by email. Thus, both the settings and inventory functions will only
ever occur if the customer previously agreed to carry out a software update. All three functionalities
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“update”, “setting”, and “inventory” share similar communication protocols. The whole system uses
TLS, a very-well known protocol designed to provide privacy and data integrity between two or more
communicating computer applications. To summarize:
• Download. The vehicle informs the user about new content available. Once the user agrees to
download it, the vehicle’s communication system will start a secure connection to the server’s
repository. It will then download the software package.
• Authentication. Thanks to the use of a chain of certificates, there is a valid mechanism to
unequivocally verify that only trusted parties were involved in the communication process.
The vehicle is programmed to only accept data directly coming from the server, by verifying its
identity using digital signatures (non-repudiation).
• Integrity. Thanks to the use of hash functions, we can ensure that themessagewas notmodified
as it travelled for an unprotected communication channel, susceptible to Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attacks.
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Fig. 2.4 Firmware Over-The-Air
Following the Figure 2.4, we can highlight the following points during a package download:
1. The supplier delivers a functional code package thanks to the use of CI, as will be presented on
Chapter x. It then signs it with its private key so its authenticity is assured, and applies a hash
function to the package so its integrity can be verified later on.
2. The server, namely VNEXT, stores every update and runs every remote service. It manages
the “software campaigns”. If requested and initialised by the client, or the vehicle’s IVC, it
will establish a TLS connection. See Annex X for further details with regard to the Public-key
cryptography, and an example of a typical TLS connection.
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3. If both communication entities are successfully authenticated, a FOTA over a secure TLS
connection over the Internet is carried out.
4. The package is successfully downloaded at the client’s side thanks to the use of the IVC’s modem.
The IVC will then pass the package over the IVI, the intelligence bearer. As seen, relevant
information may be shown at the displays, all of themmanaged by the IVI.
5. Once the gateway, or vehicle’s architecture inner firewall, is successfully transversed, the package
is ready to be transferred via the architecture towards the target ECU.
6. Once every verification process is done including the integrity of the package, it is then installed
on the target ECU and finally activated. For example, a new software improving the current
Emergency Brake Assist (EBA) system is released. Therefore, new software will be installed
on both Brake Control Module (BCM) and Suspension Control Module (SCM) ECUs. It is a
very sensible process given that many important components may be affected. Malfunctioning
software present at the BCMmay drive into a fatal accident.
Even though we are talking about the same technology and way of thinking, we must be clear on this
matter: the lifecycle of cars is different to the consumer world. We tend to change our smartphone
every 24 months or even less, but we tend to keep our cars for a longer period of time. In 2016, the
average age of passenger cars in the EU was 10,7 years; in France, it was 8,8 years in 2017. According to
ACEA, “the EUmotor vehicle fleet is getting older year-on-year” [15].
2.2.3 Remote services
Remote services are used to provide a safer, funnier, more efficient customer experience. They sup-
ply some advantageous functions such as connected navigation, remote access to information, and
convenient assistance services. They give truthful meaning to the name "connected" during the first
initial phase of connected vehicles. They only require a secure connection to enable feature-extended
capabilities. Therefore no intelligent, connected infrastructure is required. At an Alliance level, more
than 90% of all vehicles are expected to be connected by 2022 [16]. They mean an added value to a
vehicle experience9. From both marketing and strategic point of views, remote services are key to bring
added value to the driving industry. Some examples of remote services are:
1. Remote Keyless System (RKS), or remote lock and unlock, allowing the user to use its phone
application to authenticate himself and ask for the remote unlock of the vehicle. This way, there
is no need to have a mechanical key that is likely to get lost. Besides, no proximity is required,
allowing the use of this remote service anywhere –where a network connection is available,
anytime.
2. A variant remote service of RKS the so called Remote Keyless Ignition System (RKIS), allowing
for remote start of the vehicle. It may be convenient when in extreme weather conditions.
For example, if in very cold weather and low temperatures, you may start your engine early in
the morning before going to work in order to warm up the engine and turn on the A/C10 heat.
9Mostly remote services are based on proprietary paid phone applications such as "MyRenault App".
10Air Conditioner, climate control, or climatization.
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Alternatively, when in very warm weather, you may turn on the A/C prior to getting into the
car to have a smooth and pleasant temperature when entering the vehicle later on. Along with
the RKS, it opens a wider range of applications. For example, an owner can lend his vehicle to
anyone anytime. They may also facilitate the process of renting a vehicle since only a remote
access through the internet would be required to both unlock the vehicle and start the engine.
Besides, it may also boost the car sharing paradigm.
3. Remote Horn and Lights (RHL), allowing for a wide range of applications from finding the
vehicle in a crowded parking by emitting both visual and sound effects or illuminating your
path when in low sight conditions.
4. Further remote services account for remote GPS location –knowing the exact location of
your vehicle at anytime, allowing for optimal traffic management or anti-theaft applications, or
remote battery management allowing for battery optimization, to name but a few. Future
autonomous vehicles will bring remote parking, light-less autonomous driving, and so forth.
2.2.4 Google Automotive Services
"In September 2018, the Alliance signed a global multi-year agreement to partner with Google to equip
Renault, Nissan andMitsubishiMotors vehicles with intelligent infotainment systems. It will be based
on Android, the world’s most popular OS, to offer customers a new array of services including Google
Maps, the Google Assistant and the Google Play Store, scheduled to start in 2021" [16]. More precisely
and from an engineering point of view, we introduce the Google Automotive Services (GAS).
GAS is a multi Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) compatible ecosystem allowing full devel-
opment of automotive on-board applications benefiting from previously agreed mobile standards
featuring diverse modular solutions targeting different markets [17]. It provides full stack Android’s
software development and integration, enabling Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) adaptation to
the Linux Kernel lying beneath. It brings integration between the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) and the different mobile services, running on the car’s IVI.
One of the main concerns on the automotive industry is that of “why spending tons of money on
infotainment systems when there is a quicker and simpler solution being simply using your own phone
to achieve such functionalities?”. It is a fact. Everyone now holds their phones to the right of their
steering wheel and continues to use the services their smartphone provides and which they are used to.
It is hard, if not nearly impossible, to convince a faithful user to use a different platform. That is why
GAS offers a unique, continuous UX designed to reinforce the idea of brand experience and keep the
phone-to-car –therefore phone-to-IVI, transition as smooth and simple as possible.
2.2.5 Vulnerabilities: towards cybersecurity analysis
Again, this project aims to implement different automated tests in order to verify that the is a secure
system from a network point of view –see inter-vehicle communications. In other words, there is
[17]
2. Renault and connected vehicles
a need to run some tests in order to certify that the IVC is not “easily hackable”11. As engineers, we
work together side by side to build a robust system requiring several development steps. In terms
of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, one simple idea is key: there is a need to limit the risks, rather than
reduce the threats. Connected vehicles are such complex systems and therefore vulnerable –the average
modern high-end car software is 100 million lines of code, to be compared with 39.5 million lines in
2009 for Windows 7 or 13.8 million lines for a Boeing 787 [18]. We find two different cybersecurity
attacks: those who seek to gather data in order to sell it or use it perversely –i.e. user location tracking
attacks [19], and those who seek to harm the system, resulting in malfunction, interoperability, or
even full damage. Several standards are highly recommended when applying the “security by design”
paradigm [20]. Generally speaking, a car is a heavy, dangerous object. If "hacked", it can become a
serious risk to the physical security of people. Thus, cybersecurity focuses on protecting its hardware,
firmware, and software, ensuring only legit communications, detecting abnormal events or anomalies,
and managing its lifecycle.
We will assume that development tools, methods and processes –such as policies, procedures and
guidelines, where chosen with cybersecurity in mind so systems are secure by design. Many standards,
guides, and/or good-practices manuals such the ones from the ECS or ETSI have been released in order
to boost cybersecurity at a company basis. ISO 27000 family of standards that “helps organizations
keep information assets secure” [21]. ISO 26262 applies for electric and electronic systems within the
automobile industry [22]. We will also assume that all required cybersecurity concerns have been
applied on the Linux Kernel. Besides, cryptographic tools like hash and encryption function are also
considered to be secure. This means that possible failures will be based on misconfigurations, but not
on protocol or underlying technology malfunctioning.
Connected vehicles are linked to both internal and external communication networks. This necessarily
means that there are many different vulnerable points of entry. Among all of them, we highlight three
large groups:
• Mobile connectivity: an access to the global Internet Protocol (IP) network via RF antennas
where both FOTAupdates and remote services lie. They require a secure layer to protect the user
data privacy. They encompass any information related to real people, such as location, behavioral
patterns, banking information, and so forth. To ensure only legitimate communications, we
use secure protocols like TLS. This project focuses on this group.
• WPAN: composed by both Bluetooth andWiFi technologies. For example, the new Bluetooth
version 5.0 enables extended range up to 400 meters and faster data transfer.
• Physical connectors: any physically accessible interface such as the USB port.
It is said that 62% of security experts expect hackers will start using AI [23]. Thus, there is a need for
finding advanced threats. For that, we need to visualize, by using behavior analytics and forensic
trails, understand, by automation and making machines learn up to x60 faster, and stop, by applying
dynamic policies, layered security, and detection-identification-response automation. Thanks to the
use of AI, we can learn through machine and deep learning from unprecedented, new attacks. We can
11Meaning it is not either externally accessible nor its communications compromised.
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reason by gathering insights and extract data patterns. We can also augment and respond to threats
faster. Ideally, we will implement cognitive computing defenses that are adaptative, interactive, stateful
and contextual.
During this document I will implement several accessibility and connectivity tests in order to verify
if such mobile connectivity is secure. I will eventually use some AI techniques to visualize data and
eventually come up with a basic intrusion detection algorithm.
[19]
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Validation and testing
Beforewe tackle the topic of validation, we must provide some useful definitions to lay theground for. Integration is a “testing performed to expose defects in the interfaces and in theinteraction between systems”. Verification is the “confirmation by examination and through
the provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled”. Validation is the
“confirmation by examination and through provision of objective evidence that the requirements for a
specific intended use or application have been fulfilled” [13].
3.1 Continuous Integration
Continuous Integration (CI) is a development practice in which any developer belonging to a project
upload –called check-in or push, his/her code to a shared repository on an iterative basis several times
a day. Once the code arrives to the common archive, a pipeline, automated build, or set of required
test, is launched. It will fail if any integration error or malfunctioning is detected during the pipeline
process. It allows teams to detect problems early. CI major outcomes are faster code delivery, faster
and easier debugging, quicker integration times, easier integration processes, higher visibility level and
better intra-team communication. CI means ensuring no new patches can lead to failures, or bugs.
The systemmust behave, at least, as exactly as before; a new functionality will be added, but no security
breaches or new bugs shall ever appear. After a proper upload, developers may request to integrate
their code –called merge request, from their own development copy version of the project –called
branch, into the project main repository –called master branch. Repositories are based on “Git”, an
open source distributed Version Control Systems (VCS) [24]. Once the developer pushed the code,
made a merge request, and successfully integrated it, we say a patch was applied. CI good-practices
go as follows: (1) maintain a single source repository, (2) automate the build, (3) make your build self-
testing, (4) everyone commits to the master branch, (5) every commit should build on an integration
machine, (6) fix broken builds immediately, (7) keep the build fast, (8) test in a clone of the production
environment, (9) make getting the latest executable easy, (10) make the whole process visible so anyone
can see any previous change, and finally, (11) automate deployment [25]. In plain English, you initially
download the whole project and therefore create a copy to which you apply your modifications safely.
Once you believe your code is good to go, you upload it to the main repository.
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Fig. 3.1 Continuous Integration
As also shown in Figure 3.1, the find the "Agile SQUAD", just another name for "Agile Development
Team". It accounts for the "Agile software development" paradigm, mostly based on self-organizing
and cross-functional teams [26]. They answer to "don’t just fix the product, fix the process too" [27].
Essentially, the companies who did not fix the process such as BlackBerry1 or Motorola2 resulted into
failure. On the contrary, Netflix, Spotify or Apple succeeded to face scalability as they grew. More
precisely, RSWL applies the "Scrum" framework [30]. Basically it promotes and favors courage, focus,
commitment, respect, and openness of software developers within a team. A minimum size scrum is
composed by a Product Owner (PO), the developer team –composed by a front office developer and a
back office developer minimum, aQuality Assurance (QA), and, last but not least, the "ScrumMaster".
While the PO focuses on maximizing the value of the products created on the squad –or development
team, the ScrumMaster ensures that everyone understands the Scrum process, being responsible for
promoting, guiding and supporting it. For example, RSWL SIT implements scrums composed of
a 3-week sprint. It means all the work previously included within the initial backlog and planning
must be finished when the sprint is up. All year long calendar is divided into many sprints forming
groups taking 3 months in average. A whole year is divided into 4 slices, or quarters (Q) –therefore a
year has around 16 sprints, or 4 Q of about 4 sprints each. There are daily scrummeetings of about
15 minutes where all scrummembers report a little bit of what they did yesterday and what they will
develop today, at a very high-level without going to much into detail. This way all squad members
have a general idea about the whole product development process.
Belonging to the world of “continuous” we find two additional terms: “continuous deployment”, or
“continuous release” where every good build is released to users, and “continuous delivery”, making
your software always ready to be delivered, causing the process to be business-driven and not IT-driven.
“While continuous deployment implies continuous delivery the converse is not true” [31]. Deployment
requires a fully automated process as a means of smoothly transferring the software to the user.
1BlackBerry mobile phone market share: 9% in 2007, 19% in 2009, 4% in 2012, negligible share today [28].
2Motorola mobile phone market share: 23,5% in 1997, 14,3% in 2007, 1,9% in 2012, negligible share today [29].
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3.2 Validation process
RSWL software test development is entirely based on ISO 29119, an “internationally agreed set of
standards for software testing that can be used within any software development life cycle and by any
organisation”. It is currently based on a series of five published standards: 29119-1:2013 for concepts
and definitions, 29119-2:2013 for test processes, 29119-3:2013 for test documentation, 29119-4:2015 for
test techniques, and 29119-5:2016 for keyword driven testing [32].
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Fig. 3.2 Basic scheme of operation of ISO 29119 [13]
As shown in Figure 3.2, it is based on two, well-differentiated domains: Test Management Processes
andDynamic Test Processes. Thewhole system requires a test strategy that integrates the needs coming
from both the test projects and test operation teams. The Test Design is in charge of delivering a TC
catalog and all requirements for Test Environment, being the latter responsible for test automation and
test bench definition. Designing a system is a very complex task. It requires full planning in order to
wholy achieve a system that is well designed, “secure by design”, fully functional, effective and efficient.
In order to do that, a comprehensive study is carried out so all available options are taken into account.
Once the architecture is defined, it then starts a development process resulting into a final validation
process through complete testing. It is here where the Test Design block appears. It is a fundamental
entity fully in charge of defining all requirements related to the system and, based on them, create a
test catalog that includes all tests that can be actually executed, are under current development, or are
to be implemented. In plain English, it is a database of what tests can be done, what was previously
done, and will be eventually done.
A TC, or again "test case" is “a set of preconditions, inputs, actions (where applicable), expected results
and post conditions, developed based on test conditions”, where a test condition is “an aspect of
the test basis that is relevant in order to achieve specific test objectives” [34]. A test case verdict may
be PASS, where expected result of all actions are “pass” meaning they went as intended by meeting
the requirements, BLOCKED, where expected result of one precondition or pots condition is “fail”
meaning they did not go as intended based on the requirements, or FAIL, where expected result of
an action not being pre or post condition is “fail”. During this project we will only present results
being either PASS or FAIL. Test cases may be executed manually or automatically. We say that an
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action plus its expected result is a “test step” if executed manually, belonging to a so called “shared step
library” within the manual world. A test case may be composed of one or several test steps. If executed
automatically, we then refer to it as the “keyword library”, resulting in “keyword driven testing” within
the automated world. Finally, a generic set of test cases is defined as “test catalog”. Test execution
is built from actionable test cases. The test catalog at RSWL, contracted as SWCAT [13], is Xray, a
complete test management tool for Jira. As defined on its website, Jira is “the 1 software development
tool used by agile teams”. It is a Java-written proprietary issue tracking software developed by Atlassian,
an Australian software company founded in Sidney.
It is here where we find the main function of the Software Mainline and Test Management (SMTM)
team, based on the “Test Design” and “Test Catalog”. It lays the groundwork for enabling such system.
According to their own principles, its main mission is to “develop and maintain test coverage for
the integration and the qualification of RSWL software projects”. They must successfully manage
diversity, meaning many different products –or systems, for example several different IVI enabling
different capabilities, are present and therefore some steps need to be coded differently based on
its architecture and platform and ideally highly adaptable. Subsequently, we find the Development
Framework (DF) team incharge of both test environment and test automation and whose roots are
based on the Continuous Integration (CI) paradigm, further described in the upcoming section.
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Fig. 3.3 Test Catalog: a complex process
The whole process is shown in Figure 3.3. It also includes “Confluence”, the RSWL Wiki, being
“a powerful collaborative tool to communicate between coworkers to quickly share knowledge to
everyone’s benefit”. It provides a simple but complete tool that enables you to easily write and publish
a wiki document to the Renault’s intranet at the “renault.com” domain. Several people can collaborate
to the same project –and thus same wiki page, letting viewers to correct wrong already published
information. In this particular case, we use Confluence as keyword library to find customized step
procedures per vehicle and release configuration.
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3.3 Test framework: MATRIX
Micro-services Automotive Test Robot Integration eXecutor (MATRIX) states for Micro-services
Automotive Test Robot Integration eXecutor, and it is “the automation environment defined by
RSWL CCAR SIT for integration, regression and validation activities across the Alliance” [13]. It is
similar to Docker. It allows people who either do not master or even do not know how to code in
Python to design and implement test cases. It provides an abstraction layer by hiding the working
details to the non-programmer coworkers.
MATRIX is based onRobot framework, a “generic open source automation framework for acceptance
testing, acceptance test driven development (ATDD), and robotic process automation (RPA)” [33]. It
provides full source code availability, an online, always-ready, supportive development community, and
entire development independence. Besides, it is not clear that open source development frameworks are
weaker than proprietary solutions from a cybersecurity point of view. BothWannaCry and NetPetya
viruses infected proprietary code [20]. The contrary is not verifiable either though.
START: Run TC in MATRIX
MATRIX running on PC
Test Case (as .robot file)
KEYWORD 1
Keyword Library (as .robot file)
Service (as .py file)
MATRIX Console (Interface)
=====
Init TC
=====
. . . 
OUTPUT FUNCTION 1
. . .
|PASS|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(2) KEYWORD 2
KEYWORD J
KEYWORD 1
KEYWORD 2
KEYWORD i
KEYWORD K
FUNCTION 1
FUNCTION 2
FUNCTION L
(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7) END: TC Verdict (either PASS or FAIL)
Fig. 3.4 TC execution inMATRIX
Basically, Figure 3.4 explains how a test case, or TC, is automatically executed step by step inMATRIX.
It expresses in a clearer way the concept previously introduced in Figure 3.3. Concretely, let’s say
we want to run an automated TC in MATRIX (1). We will suppose that all keywords –name for
automated steps, have been previously coded allowing modular programming. Therefore, we will
build our TC taking into account our TC requirements –normaly provided to us by the test design
team. To do so, MATRIX will then execute (2) all keywords that we had previously introduced into
our TC (3), from 1 to J. They all belong to a keyword library of size K with K >= J. There, every
available keyword is linked to one or more Python methods included within a Python class within a
service –here having L different methods. Usually one service is assigned to oneMATRIX developer
–I will be the developer in charge of the comm tester service as well as the cybersecurity service. Any
chosen keyword (3) from the keyword library (4) will then run a specific Python method (5) –i.e.
keywordK is never executed in Figure 3.4 as it was not previously included on out TC. As shown, such
Python method, if requested, will print information into the MATRIX black console (6) –or to a
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log file, allowing for debugging. Normally, the Python methods are coded to return either TRUE or
FALSE based on the initial requirements –meaning they are PASS or FAIL. If one or more methods
–and therefore keywords, return FAIL, then the result of theTC is FAIL.On the contraty, if allmethods
work as intended and are PASS, then the result of the TC is PASS (7).
For example, let’s say we create a TC based on 2 different keywords. Both are linked to a single Python
method. The first method verifies if a PING get an answer from our PC to the Internet. The second
method verifies if a DNS request gets an answer to a valid domain name on the Internet. If both
methods verify such connectivity and therefore return TRUE, our keywords will be PASS and, as no
FAIL are present, the TC verdict will be also PASS –in green. Thus, having a TC FAIL means one or
more keywords were not successful meaning the expected outcomes were not met.
3.4 Cybersecurity validation, a key to success
Connected means data exchange. Exchange means interaction between two or more parties, risking
of appearance of unwanted third-parties. Data means information. Information is knowledge, and
knowledge is power. Here lies the importance of cybersecurity in general, and this project in particular.
There is today a growing concern about connected vehicles at both cybersecurity and data privacy
levels; a clear perception of lack of security. In France, 48% of people claim they never share personal
information online, versus a 19% in the US [35]. They are top priorities for customers and should be
even of higher importance for automobile manufacturer companies. Even though cybersecurity has
gained momentum lately, it is still at the starting point. Companies worldwide are becoming aware of
the importance of protecting their systems. They are exponentially increasing their investments in
computer security, computer forensics, and data analysis for intrusion detection. Returning to the
automotive industry, it is believed that the global market for connected cars will grow by 270% by 2022,
bringing new technology advances like digital key granting/revocation forMobility-as-a-Service (MaaS)
car-sharing, automatic car personalization and 3rd party access for courier and e-commerce solutions
–all managed through your smartphone. However, they come along with a huge cybersecurity risk for
brands and consumersmeaning a security first approach for connected car apps and IVI is fundamental
[36]. Therefore, as vehicles become digitalised and fully connected, the subject of security is becoming
critical. Again, both cybersecurity and privacy concerns represent the biggest obstacle to the growth of
connected cars for the 34% of all experts consulted, right before the difficulties related to technological
capabilities, at 19%, and safety concerns, at 18% [7]. When we speak of "cybersecurity", we refer to the
protection of hardware, firmware and software, ensure legitimate communications, detect unusual
events or anomalies, and manage the life cycle of systems.
At an engineering scale, measures have to be taken. What was coded yesterday is being embedded
today and will be used tomorrow. It means there is an imperative commitment related to what we
previously created, and we must act accordingly. In plain English, if we detect tomorrow a coding error
it will be too late. Thus, many corroboration steps are mandatory so there is a redundancy in terms
of acceptance and certainty. By working in this iterative approach, we benefit from both validation
and traceability outcomes. As a matter of fact, the first objective is always to achieve a 100% safety.
The perfect mark where no errors ever appeared, do not appear, and will not appear. However, as
engineers, we must come back down to Earth and face reality: failures are likely to happen and will
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happen. Quoting Murphy’s law, “whatever can go wrong, will go wrong”. Thus, in the case of an
improbable failure, the second objective would be to find exactly where the deficiency was. If it were
to happen despite of its associated tiny probability, we need to be able to go back in time even more
than 10 years of validation records. There’s a fundamental need of precisely locate any possible failure
and the reasons which caused it; many people’s lives are at stake. Validation through automated testing
and full traceability are the keys to success if the automotive industry is to exist in a digital world.
But, what is validation? What is testing? Literally speaking, what “validation through automated
testing” means? Even though we will precisely cover all these matters throughout this document, a
starting point needs to be established. According to the Oxford Dictionary [12], validation is “the
action of checking or proving the validity or accuracy of something”. Similarly, a test is “a procedure
intended to establish the quality, performance, or reliability of something, especially before it is taken
into widespread use”. And last, but not least, automationmeans “the use or introduction of automatic
equipment in a manufacturing or other process or facility”, where automatic stands for “working by
itself with little or no direct human control”. Thus, we understand this process as a very intelligent way
towards achieving our main purpose: come intelligent vehicles alive. In this matter, cybersecurity must
be implemented in a bottom-up approach. In order to succeed in achieving a completely secure ADAS
5 vehicle, we must initially protect the ADAS 1. It’s worth noting that the earlier we start thinking
this way and planning accordingly, the better the upcoming autonomous vehicle will be. Build up the
finest intelligent car, but vulnerable, would mean putting the cart before the horse. We shall start by
applying simple but compelling tests, and set up a more powerful structure from it. If such connected
vehicles are to exist, we must prove they are both legit and accurate, and demonstrate they can actively
work under any circumstances.
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Achievements
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Chapter 4
Test bench for connected vehicles
4.1 Test bench
Like any other validation project, we need to set up a test bench so we can assess the system weare working with. Ideally, it must be precisely detailed and easy to reproduce, so we can expectthe exact same outputs when introducing specific, case-dependant inputs. More precisely,
according to the Oxford dictionary, we use the test bench to carry out a bench test, “a test carried out
on a machine, a component, or software before it is released for use, to ensure that it works properly”.
We find three different important entities within the test bench:
• Network Base Station (BS), emulated by a Wideband Radio Communication Tester1, or
CMW500. It runs a set of applications on top of a Microsoft Windows XP:
– Data Application Unit (DAU), connected to a RJ-45 port located at the back of the
device. It has an internal server. It enables network connectivity, allowing performance
analysis.
– Signalling Application, connected to the RF ports located at the front of the device. It
provides full connectivity with Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) (2G),
Wideband Code DivisionMultiple Access (WCDMA) (3G) and Long-Term Evolution
(LTE) (3.95G, being almost 4G) mobile communications standards.
• Connected vehicle, composedby the In-Vehicle Communication (IVC), CANbus, andpower
supply emulating the battery. The IVC requires two different antennas to work:
– An RF antenna allowing network connectivity.
– A GPS antenna allowing positioning and time alignment.
• Remote server, namely VNEXT, the Renault’s database hosting services and certificates.
1Again, we name it "comm tester" for simplification purposes.
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Thanks to the use of such test bench, we will be able to measure and modify:
• IVC power consumption, connectivity, firewall, and more.
• Several connection status, from cell enabled/Packet Switched (PS) connection established in
telephony, network access to external websites, time to connection, certificate exchange, and
more.
• Network parameters such as the underlying network technology, band, and channel, external
attenuation, noise, to name but a few.
4.2 Scheme diagram
We will consider two different data links: (1) the IVC-to-CMW500 link, meaning from the car’s
modem to the broadband cellular network technology via 3G, and (2) the CMW500-to-VNEXT link,
meaning from the emulated BS to the Renualt’s server via the Internet. At an Alliance level, such
database for hosting services and certificates is called AVNEXT –where "A" stands for Alliance.
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It was Dominique who settled up the "Connected Vehicle" part as shown in Figure 4.1 –a colorful
version from it can be found on Appendix C.1. It means I initially received a working CAN bus and
a functional IVC powered by a power supply, but containing no certificates. I was in full charge of
settling up all the data connections by enabling the Internet connectivity through the comm tester
–meaning making the system entirely functional. Besides, the detailed specifications of the involved
entities and standards may be also found on Appendix C.2.
4.3 Configuration
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Fig. 4.2 Test bench at a network level
Several steps were required to make the system fully functional. These network configuration steps
are, by chronological order of implementation:
1. Communication Tester –“Router” 1 in the Figure 4.2
(a) Connect the device’s LAN port (called “LANDAU”) to a in-wall physical socket, or more
precisely into a RJ-45 Ethernet port, via an Ethernet cable, previously allocated with a
static, private IP address (192.168.1.5) registered on the network switch (see “Switch 1”)
that is located in the building. The device is now behind the RSWL Internet’s firewall.
(b) Configure the Intranet’s firewall. For that, the RSWL IT teammust allow all incoming
TCP and UDP traffic to the device. The device is now connected to the Internet.
(c) Bypass the device’s LAN Application to the Signalling Application (called “LAN RE-
MOTE” and “LAN SWITCH”) by using a short Ethernet cable. Both ports located at
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the back of the device, as shown in the Figure 4.3. By doing this, we extend Internet
connectivity to any device connected to the front RF connector.
LAN REMOTE LAN SWITCH LAN DAU
Fig. 4.3 Comm tester rear panel
(d) The device’s internal DNS will provide private IP addressing to all devices connected to
the front RF connector automatically –in other words, to provide Internet connectivity
to all devices beyond the comm tester such as the IVC. It will use 192.168.1.16 as its own
static, private IP address within the RF interface.
(e) All settings related to internal Applications (DAU and Signalling mainly), DNS, mod-
ulations, frequencies, powers, and so forth, are stored in the file “settings.yml”. When
properly loaded, it allows for automated settings installation. We will eventually install
the GPIB drivers in order to remotely control the device.
2. IVC
(a) First and foremost, register the IVC in VNEXT. It requires a long and somehow complex
procedure that may take up to one month to complete. Basically:
i. Contact the VNEXT certificate provisioning team located at the TCR and ask them
for a new certificate based on the Public-key cryptography paradigm. It is generated
from 3 different numbers related to the IVC (VIN, or Vehicle Identification Number,
SN, or Serial Number, and PN, or Part Number). Once the certificate is created and
stored on VNEXT, the server, we say the IVC has been “registered” into the system
and the certificate is ready to use.
ii. Push the certificate and the pair of keys (public and private) into the IVC via the
ADB commands. An IVC has an underlying Linux core running Android on top.
iii. Update the IVC’s settings related to VNEXT, such as domain name and port number.
The device is now ready to connect VNEXT–if and only if there is a working Internet
connection.
(b) Light up thepower supply at 12V and initialise theCANbusby continuously andnon-stop
sending CANmessages –we only deal here with “wake-up” and “normal use” messages.
Without battery or any car commands, the IVC will remain inoperative.
(c) Verify via ADB that the IVC is online –meaning typing “adb shell” in a commandwindow
in PC 1 controlling the IVC via the USB-to-USB mini cable. A welcome message will be
shown as in Figure 4.4.
(d) Connect the device to the comm tester via an RF cable. We will be usingWCDMA, air
interface standard found in 3G mobile telecommunication networks. The IVC we are
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Fig. 4.4 IVC’s welcoming message via "adb shell"
UTRA Band Frequency (MHz) Uplink (MHz) Downlink (MHz)
1 2100 1920 – 1980 2110 – 2170
3 1800 1710 – 1785 1805 – 1880
8 900 880 – 915 925 – 960
Table 4.1 IVC capabilities: supported UTRA bands
working with is a device that only supports 3 different UMTS frequency bands, as shown
in Table 4.1.
(e) The commtesterwill automatically assign aprivate IP address to thedevice, being 192.168.1.∗
in Figure 4.2 with a ∗ of 25, 31, or 47 depending on the day.
(f) The IVCwill then try to automatically connect toVNEXTvia the Internet. If unsuccessful,
it will keep trying based on an incrementational try-and-wait timeout.
3. Packet sniffer (“Bridge 1”)
(a) Place PC 2 (from Figure (testbench)) between the comm tester (interface “ensex...”) and
the in-wall RJ-45 socket (interface “enx...”).
(b) By running a simple Python code, we will bridge the two different interfaces. It will
therefore forward all traffic coming from one to another and all the way around. We will
call it “mybridge3”.
(c) Start capturing traffic fromWireshark, a free and open-source packet analyzer.
4. Once points 1,2 and 3 are completed, the main router (we name it here “Router 2” for sim-
plification purposes) will discover, if necessary, anyMAC address located within the network
and obtain its IP address via the ARP protocol. The IVC will then belong to another network
located beyond the comm tester, thus behind the 192.168.1.16 IP address. The network setup
will be therefore ready and functional. We have settled down and starting point.
4.4 Verification
Once the test bench is ready, including all required hardware and network connections, I need to
establish a mechanism for acknowledgement. It means I have to develop an automated code that
enables me to always start from the very same initial point. By using a predefined starting point, all
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further test carried out within the test bench will be easily reproducible and therefore comparable.
Again, validation is “the action of checking or proving the validity or accuracy of something”. I must
therefore implement not a test case but a set of actions that enable me to undoubtedly affirm that my
test bench is ready for testing and no further modifications or fixes shall or may be applied. If we are
going to deal with physical parameters, power and performance, but also with cybersecurity matters,
a main system is involved: the communication tester emulating the underlying network technology
which must ensure full connectivity. To acknowledge the communications tester, or CMW500, I
defined the following set of actions –here implemented as keywords in MATRIX:
• CHECKSET GPIB STATUS
It searches for the comm tester (RohdeSchwarz CMW500) among all the available GPIB ad-
dresses, prioritizing the one provided by the user. If it does not work, it installs the GPIB drivers
for Linux
• CHECK COMMTESTER SOFTWARE VERSION
It displays the current supported versions: the ‘Additional Maintenance Package’, the ‘BASE’,
and the ‘Data Application’
• DO COMMTESTER RECALL
It recalls the comm tester settings by loading the specified “.dfl” that must be already stored in
the comm tester
• SET COMMTESTER CONFIG
It loads the user configuration from the “settings.yml” file, such as IP address, type of DNS,
noise, external attenuation, DL and UL powers, frequencies, and so forth
• CHECKSET DNS
It tests the primary and foreign DNS server by using the configuration service app
• CHECK INTERNET CONNECTIVITY
It uses the comm tester PING functionality from the Data Application to test ICMP from the
comm tester towards an external Internet IP address
• CHECKSET GO TO LOCAL
It sends the GPIB command ‘GTL’ to the comm tester to return control over the user after
having used the remote control
Figure 4.5 shows how a series of keywords are automatically executed one after another. They serve as an
"enabler" set, implemented as a test case for simplification purposes. Not only it checks if every require-
ment is met, but also installs or updates drivers if necessary. Previous set of actions was fully described
here in a list basis, but I will avoid doing it again further in this document. It is highly dense and too
specific. For every TC, we will need to fully design and code a set of keywords. The code related to this
TC is available in Appendix D under the name “TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500.robot”
–see Section D.3. I managed to successfully verify the system. If something does not work during
the IVC validation process, it will not be due to the test bench. It is now time to start with the most
relevant step: the results.
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Fig. 4.5 Output of TC inMATRIX
For illustration purposes, some code related to TCs and keywords may be found on Appendix D.
However, most of it is not available in order to comply with required confidentiality at RSWL
Important!
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Chapter 5
Cybersecurity and performance test cases:
results and discussion
The present Chapter presents all the development and automation that I achieved during thisproject. Basically, it is divided into two well defined parts: cybersecurity, and performance.While the former focuses on the system as a whole –the IVC and the data link between the
IVC and VNEXT, the latter focuses on the IVC only, the vehicle’s on-board component that brings full
Internet connectivity. I wanted to study the IVC, or car modem, from the two different perspectives.
Once I fully automate the physical parameters and measurement methods by remote controlling
the comm tester, I will be able to build a robust system that is able to study anomaly detection, and
cybersecurity attacks by gathering not only network data but also physical data –i.e. cyber attacks may
be carried out when faded signalling while crossing a tunnel or while crossing an international border
while in cell handover mode.
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src test
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Already in MATRIX
Fig. 5.1 Scheme of part of the MATRIX project
Figure 5.1 shows in a box diagram my own implementations. As I was in charge of the full au-
tomation of the test bench –presented earlier in Chapter 4, I created and developed the so called
"eq_cmw500_test_service". It took me several weeks to find all required commands to remotely con-
trol the (eq)uipment and learn how to code it and send it through General Purpose Interface Bus
(GPIB). Besides, we may also find the vehicle service, or "vehicle_cybersec". It has all Python methods
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related to connectivity and cybersecurity test cases. Last, but not least, we find on the right part of
Figure 5.1 my collaboration to the folder "rfw_test_cases". It is a common MATRIX folder where
all developers include their keywords and test cases developed in the Robot framework. I used the
"power_supply.robot"1 to create new keywords allowing different consumption measurements.
I will present the foundations of my work, initially introducing the TC –or test case, requirements –or
"RE", in order to present the results and analyze them later on. All analysis related to different data
science aspects were carried out in “Jupyter Notebook”, an “open-source web application that allows
you to create and share documents that contain live code, equations, visualizations and narrative text”
[37].
5.1 Cybersecurity
5.1.1 Test requirements and test design
Cybersecurity tests are based on different requirements, “RE” here. They mainly come from two
complementary sources: internal, fromRSWL–coming frompreviousworks [8] andpersonal findings,
and external, from the TCR. All in all, they provide a simple but powerful tool for validating some
cybersecurity aspects of the IVC. As a common practice, all TC have a common teardown2 where,
after all automated actions have been successfully carried out, the "REMOTE" control of the comm
tester is switched to manual mode, or "READY". However, setup3 initial conditions differ from
one TC to another. I will be centering my efforts on demonstrating that the IVC is protected when
accessing the external IP network.
5.1.2 Test implementation and automation
RE 1.1: connectivity
The IVCmust be able to establish a secure connectionwithVNEXT if the certificates are legit –meaning
correct. More specifically, it will connect to MQTT, an internet broker server placed immediately
before VNEXT. It handles all incoming secure connections towards the Renault’s server, filtering
untrusted data. For that, I must ensure the IVC has connection access to the Internet. I will initially
activate the CAN bus, reboot the IVC, check that it connects via 3G to the comm tester, and finally
verify it has IP connection to the Internet. This is the first and most basic TC within this project.
Figure 5.2 shows all automated keywords executed sequentially. They are all order-dependant, for the
next keyword will only work if the previous one was successfully run. We say one keyword enables
the later. In this TC, setup initial conditions are based on making the vehicle’s modem ready to test
connectivity. It will be connected to the emulated BS, the comm tester. More precisely: once the CAN
1Service entirely developed by Dominique.
2Cleanup, last step after each test method completes.
3To set up initial state for all test methods.
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Fig. 5.2 Output of connectivity TC inMATRIX. Code is available at Appendix D
bus is activated –meaning CANmessages are being written to the bus interface “slcan0”, the IVC is
online and ready to carry out further network actions. By means of a GPIB interface, the keyword uses
an iterative request to inquiry the comm tester via GPIB about the IVC’s connection status. These
status are: offline, online, attached and connection established, or . Once the IVC is , two different
PING start: (1) the IVC pings the comm tester meaning there is data connection within the RF link,
and (2) pings any given Internet domain –to validate the DNS system being here the Romania-based
name “k.ro”. I check here that a “PINGREQUEST” is followed by a “PINGREPLY”. The IVC’s
firewall status is checked too. It simply checks how do the interfaces behave in front of incoming
data traffic by means of Linux “iptables”. They can either “ACCEPT” or “DROP” incoming packets.
By default, all IP packets coming from the RF interface “rmnet_data5” are drop if they come from
untrusted sources. It is worth noting that, if enabled, the IVC’s firewall will prevent it from answering
to any external “PINGREQUEST”. Once everything works as intended –shown in green in Figure
5.2, the TC is PASS.
Even though I initially also checked the IVC-to-VNEXT connection status, as shown in Figure 5.3a,
I decided to split it into another different TC so I could precisely control it and modify it at will.
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(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 5.3 Output of IVC connection toMQTTTC inMATRIX
Figures 5.3b and 5.3c show how I am able to control the connection status via TC. The IVC uses its
Data Connection Manager (DCM)4 to modify its connection status at will. They are: CMAT, or
“test retry strategy” meaning to try to establish a secure TLS connection to MQTT, the VNEXT
broker, DM, or “disconnect MQTT broker”, and GMS, or “get MQTT status”, either connected or
disconnected. More specifically, Figure 5.3b shows a TC that disconnects the IVC fromMQTT, while
Figure 5.3c shows how to connect it. Assuming all cryptography mechanisms are valid, I verify that all
TLS exchanges and DCMmessages are correct. They are “CONNECT” and “CONNACK”, to name
but a few. Besides, I use the Linux “cat” and “grep” functions to obtain information from the IVC’s
DCM and to filter it.
4It is the on-board communication device within the IVC that handles all connections with the remote server.
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RE 1.2: secure TLS version
VNEXTmust reject any connection coming from the IVC if the TLS version offered by the client is
unsupported. As previously stated [8], minimum software versionsmust be required in order to assure
protection against known cyber attacks. For such purpose, I use “OpenSSL”, a robust, commercial-
grade, and full-featured toolkit for the TLS protocol –kindly reminder: a quick TLS overview may
be found on Appendix B.1. It comes with any Linux distribution, so we can find it on both PC 1 and
the IVC –an IVC is just an underlying OS Linux with Android on top. Besides, we use Wireshark to
capture all traffic involved.
Fig. 5.4 Output of Secure TLS version TC inMATRIX. Code is available at Appendix D
Figure 5.4 presents the automated TC related to RE 1.2. Using previous keywords from RE 1.1, it
will initially disconnect the IVC fromMQTT if already connected. It will then try to establish two
different TLS sessions one after the other. The IVC will try to connect VNEXT via TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.2 versions.
As shown in red from Figures 5.4 and 5.5a, the “MQTT broker refused the TLS connection” while in
version 1.0 –see a MQTT’s “TLS FIN” right after the IVC’s “Client Hello” message. On the contrary,
the “MQTT broker accepted the TLS connection” while in version 1.2 –see Figure 5.5b. Unlike the
previous case, there are no end of TLS connection messages. Therefore, the TC is PASS given that
MQTT behaves securely with regard to TLS, rejecting non-recommended v1.0 but accepting v1.2.
[39]
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5.5 Wireshark traffic captures while different TLS sessions: (a) TLS v1.0, (b) TLS v1.2
RE 1.3: Denial-of-Service
The IVC must be resilient to external denial-of-service attacks that are based on data flooding. Its
external connectivity must be assured while its debugging console must remain available under any
circumstance. For that, counter measurements must be set. In theory, the IVC’s enabled firewall should
wholly protect it.
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Fig. 5.6 DoS attack network layout
Globally known, a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack sole purpose is to overwhelm a specific server and
the firewall protecting it. Its principle is simple: to send a large number of data targeting a server so
that the device’s ability to process incoming data and respond get blocked. We say that the device,
service or system under attack “freezes” –there is no external connectivity. If the attack comes from
multiple, synchronized, distributed sources, we then say it is Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS).
Such attacks are normally based on User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [38, 39], a very well-known ISO
layer 4 connectionless protocol for establishing low-latency and loss-tolerating connections. Running
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on top of IP, consequently also referred to as UDP/IP, it provides process-to-process communications
viamessages, or datagrams, requiring a port number. It is ideal for voice, video and gaming applications.
Alternatively we find Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [40, 39], another very well-known ISO
layers 4 and 5 connection-oriented protocol for enabling flow control and establishing error-free data
transmissions. Running on top of IP, consequently referred to as TCP/IP, it provides host-to-host
communications. It is ideal for messaging and secure exchanges.
For this RE 1.4 and as shown in Figure 5.6, we will basically require (1) a functional, online IVC with
enabled firewall, in black, and (2) a regular PC with connectivity access, in red, located in the
same intranet than the previous IVC. It is PC 1 the one that will carry out the DoS attack –its simple
but powerful Python code may be consulted on Appendix D.
Fig. 5.7 Output of DoS attack TC inMATRIX
Figure 5.7 shows how I implemented the DoS attack. Right after the IVC’s connectivity is verified, and
its “adb shell” is alive, PC 1 starts the DoS UDP flooding attack. It results in a blocked IVC whose “adb
shell” is dead and has no external connectivity. I use a multiprocess code for testing it up. It remains
blocked as long as the attack takes place. No PING messages, TCP connections, or any other data
exchange are possible. Therefore, the result of this particular TC is clearly FAIL. For a given software
version –IVC’s current running version is 12.1, the IVC is not protected against flooding attacks. Some
direct consequences would be to make the IVC unable to transmit any warning message in case of
danger, or any position or environment information in case of dense traffic while in assisted driving.
It would also mean no FOTA and no remote services. Thanks to the joint capabilities of "Scapy", a
packet manipulation tool for computer networks [41], andWireshark, the packet capturing tool, I can
analyze all incoming traffic. It allows me to apply some data science techniques in order to characterize
such traffic and try to ignore it if necessary –further readings related to DoS attack detection based on
ML algorithms may be found in [42].
For example, let me introduce you the Figure 5.8, containing two different Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [43] analysis applied over the incoming traffic to the IVC. Thanks to the use of PCA
from “sklearn”, a Python library for data science, I am able to convert correlated variables related to
the traffic into uncorrelated components of smaller dimension –the so called “scaling”. In this case,
I take 20 different variables such as the packet id, flag, checksum, payload, protocol, to name but a
few. PCA is a tool in exploratory data analysis, also ideal for making predictive models. On Figure
(pca).a, we see all traffic involved during a typical connection from the IVC to MQTT as in RE 1.1.
It is based on two principal components whose variation values are 36,5% for “pca-one”, or first and
most relevant PCA component, and 29,7% for “pca-two”, or secondmost important PCA component.
Similarly on Figure (pca).b, We show the captures right after the UDP flooding attack, with 35,5% and
[41]
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Fig. 5.8 Visualization of a DoS attack through PCA: (a) before, (b) after
27,4% respectively. One could think about creating and integrating an uncomplicated algorithm that
would serve as a protection against it. Once the PCA is calculated over enough training data, it could
be easily applicable to all incoming traffic as a mathematical operation. We just need to compute the
mathematical coefficients and apply to test data. For example, I could use the Figure (pca).b to find
patterns associated to DoS attacks. For example, we could say that they are based on dense, linearly
distributed attacks whose slope into the PCA-one vs PCA-two domain is close to 0,5.
RE 1.4: accessibility
The IVCmust not be accessible from the Internet –generally speaking, vehicles cannot be accessed
from the Internet. For that, counter measurements must be set. Just as it happened on RE 1.3, a
firewall is expected to work. When we say “accessible”, we mean ICMP and TCP protocols. ICMP
is an Internet Layer protocol mostly use to report errors and verify that a host may or may not be
reachable. TCP is a Transport Layer protocol for connection oriented data exchanges. Therefore, I will
test whether the IVC ignores both protocols or not. I will use “adb shell” to request for the open TCP
ports. Even though they may be open, the firewall should DROP any incoming TCP SYN trying to
establish a TCP connection –for example someone trying to establish a secure TLS connection. I use
“netcat”, a Linux computer networking utility for reading from and writing to network connections
using TCP, for establishing such connections.
Figure 5.9 shows the result of this particular TC. When the IVC’s firewall is enabled –as in Figure 5.9a,
no PING –“timeout”, or TCP SYNmessages –“(tcp) timed out”, are answered. If either the PING
nor the TCP protocol succeed, the TC is PASS. I then affirm the IVC’s accessibility is well protected.
We can see in Figure 5.9c how the external “attacker” –the one who is trying to connect to the car’s
modem, tries to retransmit all unanswered TCP SYN messages from 192.168.1.69. In this case, the
IVC has two different IP addresses, 192.168.1.25 in 5.9a and 5.9b, and 192.168.1.31 in 5.9c, due to DNS
dynamic address assignment –screenshots were taken on two different days. On the contrary, I present
to you the Figure 5.9b whose TC is FAIL. After the firewall has been disabled, both PING –“ping
reply”, and TCP SYNmessages –“Connection (...) succeeded”, get a response. However, it does not
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 5.9 Output of IVC accesibility TC inMATRIX
imply the IVC is unsecure. Once a firewall is disabled, no protection measurements are present at the
system. Obtaining a TC FAIL when the firewall is disabled is reasonable, yet unpleasant.
RE 1.5: secure accessibility
The IVC, as client, must reject any TLS secure connection if the server’s certificates are unknown,
self-signed, expired, or corrupted. Given that I obviously cannot control either MQTT ot VNEXT
at will, I will be using an alternative TLS server for dealing with secure connections. Basically, I will
use OpenSSL to define a listening TLS server on PC 1 at port 4438. For that, I will use the “s_server”
option and all required keys and certificates. I will be using our own server so we need to define a
self-signed certificate. I will force the IVC to connect to the fake server by means of “s_client”.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5.10 Output of TLS connection to a fake server TC in MATRIX: (a) server forces TLS v1.0, (b)
server forces TLS v1.2
Figure 5.10 shows how the IVC, when forced to, establishes a TLS connection with a foreign server
even though its certificates are self-signed. As shown in Figure 5.10a, the IVC accepts insecure TLS
versions, such as the not-recommended-to-use v1.0. I am also able to write data into the IVC’s console
–see decrypted message.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 5.11 Output of IVC accesibility TC inMATRIX
Precisely, Figure 5.11 shows how a TLS connection can be established between the IVC –192.168.1.31 on
Figure 5.11b, and the fake TLS server running on PC 1 –192.168.1.69 on Figure 5.11a. At the bottom
of both images we find a simple toy dialogue5 where the “Application Data” occur –as in Figure 5.11c
representing the captured traffic.
5.1.3 Results and discussion
Previous sections allowed a simple but powerful analysis with regard to the cybersecurity of the IVC.
For a given software version, I demonstrated that the IVC:
• Cannot be externally accessible if firewall enabled
• Gets blocked after a DoS attack even if firewall enabled
• Can establish a TLS session with untrusted server and non-recommended protocol version
Besides, I checked that VNEXT –via MQTT, does not accept incoming TLS sessions when asking
for non-recommended protocol versions such as v1.0. I reported these results to the Groupe Renault
cybersecurity experts at the TCR, Paris. For that, I arranged an online meeting on the 17/04/2019 with
a Security and Innovation Project Manager, a Cybersecurity Engineer, and a Cybersecurity Specialist.
During this RSWL/TCRmeeting and thanks to the previously presented findings, we agreed to the
following terms:
5«-This is just a simple message, +Hello from the IVC, -Hello from the PC, +Theoretically I shouldn’t be doing this.»
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1. I, asRSWLemployee includedwithin theMATRIXproject, was able to objectively demonstrate
that cybersecurity test cases can be automated and thus integrated into the test catalog of
automated test cases.
2. There was a positive compromise between RSWL and TCR towards defining a common
framework for collaboration to have an automated test bench for cybersecurity. A roadmap
was agreed by the TCR to iteratively provide test requirements and increase their participation
within the MATRIX project. Plus, an interactive on-site meeting is planned in Toulouse.
3. The TCR is interested on cybersecurity tests log reviewing.
5.2 Performance
When I say “performance” I refer to power and performance analysis. They are both covered by the
Power and Performance (PnP) team who analises, optimises, debugs, and develops all test related to it.
During this project, I worked as a developer in order to deliver a working product –several automated
test cases, to the team, playing the role of client.
5.2.1 Test requirements and test design
Differently than previously presented, the requirements and specifications related to performance
had not been yet written not released during the realization of this part of the project. Instead, the
already achieved automation of the communication tester opened the possibility to carry out reliability
and robustness testing on the one hand, and power and consumption testing on the other. Basically,
the idea was to fully automate three different testing requirements. Instead of focusing on my TC
implementations as I did before, I will visualize the TC outcomes to provide with a full tangible
findings.
5.2.2 Test implementation and automation
RE 2.1: Time-To-Connection
Time-To-Connection (TTC) is the time taken by the IVC to recover the Internet connectivity once the
RF link is lost for a certain period of time –therefore there is a loss of data connection. As we look for
stable and consistent results, many iterations will be carried out –reliability test. In order to measure
the time the IVC takes until Internet reconnection once the RF signal is off for a certain time we need
to define a simple algorithm. I initially developed it into a single keyword composed by all required
steps, and run into a simple TC. These are:
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1. Set 3G cell to “off”
2. Start for loop:
(a) Set 3G cell to “on”
(b) Wait until 3G cell is verified to be “on”
(c) Start timer
(d) Start while loop until ping is working or ping connection timeout is up:
i. Try ping to an Internet address
ii. If ping “ok”:
A. Measure time through timer and write it to file
B. Exit while loop
iii. If ping “ko”:
A. Sleep a certain time
B. Add taken time to timer, and keep trying 2.d.i
Fig. 5.12 Visualization of output of TTC TC of over 900 iterations in MATRIX
The Figure 5.12 represents the initial solution for RE 2.1 for over 900 iterations taking almost 7 hours
to complete. As shown, two different behaviors are present: a generalized of around 23 seconds, and
a secondary, less frequent of 31 seconds or higher. The latter tends to happen more frequently in
the second half of the test. Therefore, the hourtime the test is launched may affect the results. No
measurement takes longer than 35 seconds; it is an important result that will be analyzed later on. I
also detect an oscillatory behavior, so I will focus on it. It is worth noting I am using a resolution of
0.1 seconds.
Figure 5.13 is a zoomed version of Figure 5.12, centered at iteration index number 400. All waves have a
similar pattern, as shown in Figure 5.14. It may suggest that the IVC presents somehow a wavy pattern
when trying to reconnect to the Internet, based on all mechanisms and actions needed to recover
connection. The max-to-min ratio within this oscillatory pattern may be of only 1 second, but thanks
to the analysis of data I found something interesting. Even though I am not able to say why this
[46]
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Fig. 5.13 Zoom of over 250 iterations from Figure 5.12
Fig. 5.14 Further analysis on iterations
happens, I can definately inform about its existence to the PnP team. I ran over 10 same tests and all
had the same underlying pattern. Thus, from now own, I will decrease the TTC resolution so only
steps of 1 second can be considered. The wavy pattern will then disappear.
We can consider another type of study: the prediction of time peaks. As shown in Figure 5.15 in red,
initial Figure 5.12 was normalized so maximumTTC times of 30 seconds or higher are considered to be
1. Such peaks may be considered to follow a random distribution. However, I decided to implement
an algorithm based onML techniques in order to try, at least, to estimate the presence of such peaks.
The idea is simple: use the samples I have to train a model on howmany iterations remain until a new
peak of 30 seconds or above arrives.
Figure 5.16 shows this idea. After every peak, an iteration counter is set backwards so I precisely know
howmany remaining iterations are left until a new peak. For example, taking the image above, there is
a peak at the iteration index 1225. Consequently, a backwards iteration counter starts at 1225 whose
[47]
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Fig. 5.15 Version of Figure 5.12 where higher peaks have been normalized to one
Fig. 5.16 Triangles representing time to next peak arrival
value is around 525. It will decrease 1 point at every iteration until the arrival of a next peak at iteration
index 1750. This backwards iteration counter will be then 0. I use this triangular pattern, or remaining
time until next peak, for data prediction.
Figure 5.17 represents a working example of this idea. On it, several MLmodels such as random forests
or neural networks are fed with different available information related to the data I want to predict
–therefore colors and labels are not relevant here. We are dealing here with a predictive maintenance
project related to aircrafts –carried out as a scholar project at ISAE-SUPAERO in cooperative working
teams of 3 students while in a data science Hackathon6. We are estimating the Remaining Useful
Life (RUL) [44] value, or time in cycles before the engine fails and equivalent to our next ping peak
prediction, by using data related to many different sensors located within the engine –equivalent to
6Design, sprint-like event in which computer programmers and others involved in software development collaborate
intensively on software projects
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Fig. 5.17 Several coordinatedMLmodels to predict time-series data
our supplementary information related to ping time, duration, target address, and so forth. As a result,
we devise a decent slope, in dark green. We will use this slope to draw a line representing precisely the
triangles we would like to predict from Figure 5.16.
Back to the topic, I used a single keyword to implement this TC. However, it does not follow the main
idea of the MATRIX paradigm: building automated test based on several keywords enabling modular
testing. In plain English, we have to code a robust test case where each step belongs to a different, well
defined function –or keyword. Now, each action within the function must be coded into a single,
different keyword. All the complexity is extracted from a single keyword to many. The idea behind
the algorithm is the same though. This more functional, modular programming provides multiple
combinations enabling easier test case design and implementation.
Fig. 5.18 Visualization of output of modular-through-keyword TTC TC of 6000 iterations in MA-
TRIX
[49]
5. Cybersecurity and performance test cases: results and discussion
Figure 5.18 shows the first results obtainedwith this newTCversionbuilt onmodular keywordprogram-
ming and error handling. It may be seen that both 24 and 35 second behaviors are present. However,
there are much more higher peaks of around 180 seconds –180 is the chosen timeout before the target
address is considered unreachable. In order to obtain who was causing these unprecedented errors, I
completed the TC with an error log so I could catch the different errors –full robot code related to this
TCmay be found on Appendix D under the name "TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET.robot".
We reduced it to two different hypothesis:
1. I am causing the GPIB to fail, but I do not know why. It may be due to using a wrong settling
time, or that I am sending the wrong instructions or even right instructions but in the wrong
order. Alternatively, I may be causing the GPIB interface to be overcharged. All these problems
lead to the same solution: it requires a GPIB drivers full reinstallation.
2. The IVC status is not CEST, or “Connection ESTablished”, meaning it was not able to use the
3G technology over the RF interface to connect to the comm tester.
Fig. 5.19 Number of errors due to IVC and to GPIB
14:00 18:00 00:00 05:00 11:00 17:00 23:00 04:00 11:00 16:00 21:00 03:00 09:00
N N+1 N+2 N+3
Fig. 5.20 Sliding average window over 6000 iterations
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Even though 5962 out of 6000 iterations in TC from Figure 5.19 are positive and result into no errors,
38 are entirely based on either theGPIB connection or, a priori, a malfunctioning into the IVC network
capabilities. It means my developed code and therefore any resulting TC is robust face errors and it
may catch unprecedented bugs.
Last, but not least, I introduce the Figure 5.20. It accounts for all 5932 previous successfully iterations
where their average has been subtracted, and a sliding average is shown in dark blue. It reinforces the
previously presented hypothesis: “the hourtime the test is launched may affect the results”. On the
upper part of the image I find the hourtime, as well as the nth day as stated by the capital letter “N”.
As shown, the moving average tells me that the network may be densely used on the late night or early
morning7 resulting in higher TTC values.
RE 2.2: power
The IVC must set a specific output power value at his transmitting uplink RF antenna, providing
stable, precise readings. In plain English, we must get what we ask for.
Fig. 5.21 Visualization of output of output power TC inMATRIX
Figure 5.21 shows a fine slope where all automatedmeasurements allow to certify that the output power
emitted by the IVC’s RF antenna works as intended. To obtain this assessment I precisely measured
the path attenuation caused by connectors and cable. It took a value of 5.2 dB in average due to the 3
dB power splitter that was initially conceived for cell handover while in two comm tester mode. From
Figure 5.21, in turquoise, we see the real measured power at the comm tester’s input RF connector –see
Figure C.4 in Appendix C.1. I made the comm tester to compensate this path attenuation, as shown in
blue. The maximum output power is 25 dBm. Above that, the power remains flat. On the contrary,
RF link is out of synchronization below -73 dBm –Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection lost.
7Amaury –SITManager, confirmed this hypothesis. They update and synchronize all servers when no one is at the
office, typically at odd hours. This shows the potential value of my work: I find problems which I escalate to the experts so
they can devise why they happen.
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RE 2.3: consumption
A study of IVC’s consumption, in mA, is carried out based on its frequency and its RF antenna output
power. The idea is to perform a frequency sweep all over the IVC’s 3 compatible Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS) frequency bands –900, 1800 and 2100MHz.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5.22 Visualization of output of "Frequency vs power vs consumption" TC in MATRIX: (a) all
UMTS bands, (b) only band 1
Figure 5.22 shows two different TC realizations. All 3 bands are considered in Figure 5.22a. On the
contrary, Figure 5.22b includes only the 2100Mhz band number 1. As expected, the higher the IVC’s
RF antenna output power, the higher the battery consumption is. Even though it remains flat for
a wide power range from -40 to 10 dBm, it rises exponentially beyond 10. It may suggest to ideally
operate below 10 dBm.
5.2.3 Results and discussion
Once again, results present the IVC as a robust system. RE 2.1 showed possible reliability issues on the
0,000063% of iterations, or 1 every 150. We reported it to the Groupe Renault PnP experts at RSWL.
For that, I arranged a meeting on the 12/06/2019 with different field-experts: a Software Test Architect,
a PnP Software Architect, and a PnP Software System Engineer. During this internal RSWLmeeting
we agreed to the following terms:
1. The power linearity test, although interesting, does not correspond to RSWL. It is the main
supplier, or Tier 1, who must certificate their furnished hardware components –IVC’s Qual-
comm RF modem in this case. However, it may be useful from a reliability testing point of
view.
2. Although the connection time test is a meaningful test, we must ensure several factors first,
including: (1) check the private network internal connections with Taoufik KEBBACHE (IT IS
Security Manager IS at RSWL-Toulouse site), (2) verify availability of target IP address, and (3)
retrieve CMW500 DAU logs in order to verify that it is the IVC the one causing errors and not
someone else like the internal DAU, the internal private network, and so forth. However, the
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interest related to this test case highly increases when dealing with a full IVC-to-AVNEXT link
connection.
3. Power consumption tests and consumption validation must be carried out by the main supplier.
However, it may serve as a basis for future test case development at a PnP team level. Alternative
power test cases will be considered. For example, Multi-System consumption measurements.
5.3 Documenting my work
Even though I found some interesting results, the work is not done yet. It is well known that the
“Manifesto for Agile Software Development” advocates for “Working software over comprehensive
documentation” [26]. However, I successfully implemented and then analysed what was initially
demanded. Thus, there is a need to make it easily reproducible. It is why I am currently developing a
comprehensive guide in Confluence, the wiki at an Alliance level and very much used by any member
at RSWL. It may help others to easily learn about what was achieved. Besides, it may motivate them to
eventually obtain further, more complete analysis and results.
Fig. 5.23 Confluence documentation. “V2vNext” stands for IVC-to-VNEXT
Figure 5.23 shows a screenshot of what I am currently developing. It means the completion of my work
on this project, ending the cycle: requirements, implementation, automation and, last but not least,
documentation.
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Conclusions and future development
6.1 Conclusions
From a technical point of view, this project got two main achievements. On the one hand, Isuccessfully demonstrated that cybersecurity tests can be fully automated and integrated intothe MATRIX project. I boosted the relationships between the Groupe Renault cybersecurity
experts at TCR and test automation experts in RSWL, providing a basis for future cooperative projects.
On the other hand, I provided a solid automated test bench that laid the groundwork for future test
cases combining cybersecurity algorithms with physical measurements and adaptable scenario settings.
A simpleTC enabling data gathering and further data science analysis will allow cybersecurity experts to
develop broader security measures and expand the “secure by design” paradigm. Thanks to automated
TC we are able to easily reproduce our test bench anywhere and collect data anytime. As previously
stated: connected means data exchange. Data means information. Information is knowledge, and
knowledge is power.
All in all, 8 different TCwere presented: 5 related to cybersecurity and 3 related to performance. Despite
being simple, they serve as basis for upcoming, more complex TC. They were a necessary step required
before going into deeper detail and representing the foundation stone into a bigger project that is a
completely validated, secure connected vehicle. All code I developed into this project will be accessible
anywhere within the Alliance, in France and overseas. Near-shore1 and off-shore 2.
From a practical point of view, this project reinforces the idea of cooperative work. I followed the
previous results achieved by Xavier, ancient intern at RSWL, with regards to cybersecurity. He made a
comprehensive and complete work in which he precisely described many concerns about computer
security. He provided fundamental stages in embedded software cybersecurity certification. More
precisely, he completely analyzed thewhole IVC-to-VNEXT link in order to provide a formal validation
tool focused on TLS and its possible weak points. I came later on and took advantage of what he made.
It allowed me to partially cover some of his findings with my automated test cases. Despite being "just"
1European subsidiary software development centers located in France or Romania for example
2Asian subsidiary software development centers located in China or India for example
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interns, we provided added value to the RSWL Intellectual Property (IP) and enjoyed from amutual
beneficial outcome.
6.2 Future development
I believe two different approaches can be followed up in terms of "future development". On the one
hand we have the algorithms and analysis that enable the continuation of my work. Take for example
the test case results related to the prediction of time peaks in IVC’s . Even though we introduced a
simple yet powerful analysis on Chapter 5, I lacked both data and time to go beyond. I would have
had to measure and gather much more information in order to provide the predictive MLmodel with
meaningful data to learn. For example, I could have used the daytime, the hour, the target ping address,
the battery consumption, the number of running process simultaneously on the IVC, to name but a
few, to make a more robust predictive model. Besides, this analysis may not be relevant in terms of this
particular given problem. However, it may be used when studying anomaly detection or monitoring
possible cyber attacks, enabling for more powerful systems built from different ideas, projects and
developers. On the other hand, more conceptual ideas are likely to be continued. They are tunnelling,
speed of vehicle, and cell handover. These are all 3 main aspects that were not unfortunately covered
within this project. Even though I partially modelled adaptive path attenuation simulating tunneling
and carmovement, I did not finally used on the results. Besides, I initially tried to carry out cell handover
between two different comm testers, with unpleasant results. Even though I achieved it several times
–by lowering the power from one comm tester and rising the other one smoothly at the same time by
hand, it was clear that a comm tester controller was indeed required –we can find the “RS® CMWC”
on the lab. Just like in the real world, two different BS have a communications and synchronization
protocol that enables the smooth change from one mobile cell to another without any loss of data
connection. They may also have different frequencies so synchronization is key. However, I did it by
hand and no synchronismmeasures were taken into consideration –more precisely, they were not even
available. Therefore, cell handover remains an important role to cover in future development. Both
tunneling and cell handover provide a full new world of possibility in regards cybersecurity attacks. It
is where physical and environmental conditions that are not ideal result into failures and malfunctions
–such as the well-known "Sybil Attacks" [45] that I initially studied but never implemented.
Apart from physical configurations and further development, more complex cybersecurity attacks and
defenses may be implemented. I did not try to break the TLS connection by implementing already
well-known attacks –as shown in Appendix B.3. MITM attacks are also available, for I already set up
the PC 2, or packet sniffer, in themiddle of the connection. Alternatively, more data science techniques
may be applied to measurements where applicable. For example, they may allow us to monitor and
detect anomalies where power consumption exceptionally rises for no reason.
6.3 Personal review
From a professional point of view I feel recognition and a feeling of pride. I was given the oppor-
tunity to deal with real-world systems –and real-world problems, and found to be successful. From
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minute one I was in full charge of the test bench automation. Once I demonstrated to my manager I
was a responsible professional, I was left alone with the comm tester, a device that goes up to 400k
USDwhen new. I also attendedMATRIX daily meetings and felt better than welcome –for I was fully
immersed into a "Scrum" (an Agile framework) and a daily stand-up with other team developers and
interns. I was given the opportunity to listen to engineers but also to be heard, receiving supportive
and encouraging messages in a weekly basis. Even though, as assistant, did not belong to any specific
"Sprint", I constantly worked on my own, personalized "Epics". MATRIX and the connected vehicles
are a complex topic that require an adaptive process. There are many things involved to consider,
so learning is key. I was given the time and materials to keep up with my global understanding of
the system, and for that I am thankful. Besides, Dominique, my advisor at Renault Software Labs
(RSWL), gave me reasonable freedom in terms of the project evolution so I could choose where I
wanted to invest my time and effort, collaborating on the things that I liked more. From a "big picture"
point of view, I really value the fact that I helped somehow developing –in a wider sense, a better, more
secure connected vehicle. I really learned how to work in a complex project involving many people
frommany different backgrounds and fields of expertise.
Before this project, I also successfully completed an internship on data science focusing on the auto-
mated generation of critical test cases in the field of ADAS. This means that over 90% of my current
professional experience applies to RSWL. Therefore I can be no wrong when I say that the Groupe
Renault in general and RSWL in particular bring professional opportunities to young graduates and
students. They offer full support to engineering students, and for that I am thankful.
From a personal point of view I cannot thank enough both the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya,
or Technical University of Catalonia, in English (UPC), and Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de
l’Espace, or Higher Institute of Aeronautics and Space, in English (ISAE-SUPAERO), Engineering
Schools. They allowed me to fully immerse into a different country. Thanks to them, I call France now
a home. Not only I enjoyed from an international Double Degree program, but also enjoyed from a
dual student-employee status at Renault Software Labs (RSWL).
It is only by investing on the younger generations how we push Europe forward and build
a better future for everyone of us all.
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Appendix A
Added value
(a) (b)
Fig. A.1 Upcoming cockpit architecture: (a) 3-display cockpit, (b) L-shape 2-display display cockpit
Connected vehicles will bring added value to car makers. We live in a digital society now where screens
grow in size as time goes by. One of the features that increases a car’s added value is that of cockpit
display surface, as seen in Figure x.a. It is formed of three major displays: the cluster (1), located behind
the steering wheel and displaying the dashboard and car parameters such as fuel consumption or
current speed, Head-Up Display (HUD) (2), a mirrored display located straight into the windshield
providing traffic information without perturbing the driver’s attention, and Center Information
Display (CID) (3), regarded as the infotainment hub, located between the driver and the front-seat
passenger, improving the driving experience. Some current market values of such cockpit displace
surface:
• Tesla Model S: 1100 cm2
• Audi A8: 980 cm2
• Mercedes E class: 810 cm2
• Volkswagen Passat: 730 cm2
• NewRenault Clio V: 415 cm2
It is worth noting that smartphone screens present higher PPI values with respect to vehicle screens as
smaller viewing distances are required. Besides, elderly people need higher values given their vision
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quality decreases over the years. In other words, same viewing distance require different PPI values
based on the driver’s age. Current vehicle screens have a minimum of 100 PPI for a maximum viewing
distance of 85 cm. Comparatively speaking, a high-end Samsung screen bears over 500 PPI requiring
less than 25 cm of viewing distance [13].
At an Alliance level, Renault chose to use its CID in portrait mode whereas Nissan uses it in landscape
mode. Key features are therefore based upon the increasing size of the triplet cluster/HUD/CID,
off-board content and settings, and skin updates. Infotainment systems must be both emotional
and functional. It means they must be stylish and bear a nice appearance while being easy to read,
accessible, user friendly, and, last but not least, safe in use. From a cost analysis perspective, there is
also a trade-off between HMI customer value estimation and its actual cost. For example, an Audi A4
system cost ranges from 200 to 400 € but implies an added value from 300 to 700 € respectively. A
normal evolution in terms of quality goes from a low variant system without any screen, lacking the
triplet cluster/HUD/CID, to a standard system with both small cluster/CID screens, an upper system
with larger cluster/CID screens, and finally a high-end system with even larger cluster/CID screens
of around 12 inches each and a HUD. It is believed that eventually, as shown in Figure x.b, we will
have a L-shape (1) cockpit screen including all previous luxury-appearance systems, plus the already
mentioned HUD (2).
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Transport Layer Security (TLS)
B.1 Secure connections
The TLS protocol, or Transport Layer Security, is the most important and widespread solution for
any secure exchange over the network. It was conceived to replace SSL, its now-deprecated predecessor.
Based on the peer-to-peer paradigm, it encapsulates application data to provide both integrity and
authentication. According to the Oxford Dictionary, integrity is “the state of being whole and undi-
vided”. More precisely, the “internal consistency or lack of corruption in electronic data”. Similarly,
authentication is “the process or action of proving or showing something to be true, genuine, or valid”.
Let’s suppose that Alice sends data to Bob over the Internet. In plain English, TLS will assure Bob
that Alice is really Alice, and that nobody altered what she just sent him.
B.2 Versions
To date, four different versions have been officially released:
• TLS 1.0, first defined in RFC 2246 in 1999, was conceived as an upgrade of SSL 3.0, vulnerable
to the POODLE attack. SSL 3.0 was deprecated in RFC 7568 in 2015. They are not compatible
(see RFC 6176). A TLS 1.0 connection can be downgraded to SSL 3.0, making it insecure and
not recommended for use. Thus, its deprecation is planned for 2020.
• TLS 1.1, first defined inRFC4346 in 2006, was conceived as un upgrade toTLS 1.0, vulnerable to
CBC and BEAST attacks. Some of themajor technological companies have planned to deprecate
it in 2020.
• TLS 1.2, first defined in RFC 5246 in 2008, was conceived as un upgrade to TLS 1.1.
• TLS 1.3, first defined in RFC 8446 in 2018, was conceived as un upgrade to TLS 1.2. It is the
most recent version of TLS, and it is advisory to use it for assured protection.
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TLS Client TLS Server
(4) ClientHello
(1) TCP SYN
(2) SYN ACK
(3) ACK
(5) ServerHello, Certificate, ServerHelloDone
(7) ClientKeyExchange, ChangeCipherSpec, Finished
(9) ChangeCipherSpec, Finished
CipherSuite
ClientRandom 
ServerRandom 
(6) 
Certificate 
Verification 
(8) 
Certificate 
Verification 
(10) Data Exchange
(11) TCP FIN
(12) FIN ACK
(13) ACK
Fig. B.1 Fully labeled TLS handshake and conversation
B.3 Vulnerabilities
Most of the TLS vulnerabilities and attacks are based on downgrading the current TLS version to the
oldest one possible, ideally deprecated, in order to exploit known vulnerabilities. As countermeasures,
there aremany sites that only accept TLS 1.3 as legit. Other famous TLS attacks are CRIME, BREACH,
and Heartbleed. We present on Table B.1 the actions to be taken in order to avoid the aforementioned
attacks [8].
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Attack Description Countermeasures
POODLE MITM attack Disable SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0
(CVE-2014-3566)∗ Use only TLS 1.1 or higher
Use TLS FALLBACK SCSV cipher
BEAST Cyber attack on CBC cipher used Use only TLS 1.1 or higher
(CVE-2011-3389) by SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0
CRIME Use DEFLATE compression DEFLATE not included
(CVE-2012-4929) method to brute force data as
cookies
BREACH Use the HTTP compression Disable HTTP compression,
(CVE-2013-3587) algorithm separate secrets from user input,
mask and randomize them,
protect vulnerable pages with
CSRF, rate-limiting requests
Heartbleed Improper input validation, buffer Use OpenSSL 1.0.1g or higher
(CVE-2014-0160) over-read
DROWN Able to fully decrypt a TLS session Disable SSL 2.0
(CVE-2015-3197) Use OpenSSL 1.0.2f or higher
LOGJAM Insecure Diffie-Hellman (DH) key Use a DH key higher than 2048 bits
(CVE-2015-4000) exchange with key < 2048 bits
Secure Renegotiation Vulnerability on the renegotiation Enable secure renegotiation by
(CVE-2009-0160) process initiated when the client is preventing the client to initiate it
setting a new key
(∗) Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, a database of publicly known cyber attacks
Table B.1 TLS attacks, descriptions, and countermeasures
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C.1 Figures
Fig. C.1 Test bench setup. Only one comm tester was finally used (see 50Ω resistor)
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Fig. C.2 Laboratory setup
Wideband Radio Comm Tester
Power Supply
IVC
PC 1 (Main Program)
PC 2 (Packet Sniffer)
CAN Bus
Fig. C.3 Laboratory setup with labels
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RF CONNECTORS
Fig. C.4 Comm tester’s RF connectors. We only used port “RF 1 COM” during this project
Fig. C.5 Comm tester front display. Example of IVC’s Connection ESTablished (CEST)
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C.2 Specifications: standards and entities
IEEE 488 (GPIB)
Description Specification for short-range digital communications
RS-232 (Serial)
Description Standard for serial communication
Hardware UART, computer hardware device for asynchronous serial communications
SCPI
Description Standard for syntax and commands to use in controlling programmable test
and measurement devices
Transmitted over GPIB, Serial
CAN Bus
Description Vehicle bus standard to allow inter-microcontroller communications
USB
Description Inter-computer and inter-device communication standard
Table C.1 Standards used on the test bench
Wideband Radio Communication Tester 2G/3G/4G Base Station
Maker Rohde&Schwarz GmbH&Co KG
Name R&S® CMW500
Model 1201.0002K50, selection R&S®CMW-S600B
Software version 3.5.131
IVC Car’s modem
Maker Continental Automotive Systems, Inc.
Name AIVC Board
Software version 12.1
OpenSSL version 1.1.0, 25 Aug 2016
Power Supply Car’s battery
Maker Agilent Technologies, Inc.
Name Agilent E3648A
PC 1 Running MATRIX
Maker Intel Corporation
Name & Processor NUC, Intel®Core i7-5557U CPU@ 3.10GHz x 4
OS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
OpenSSL 1.1.1a, 20 Nov 2018
PC 2 Running Wireshark
Maker Intel Corporation
Name & Processor NUC, Intel®Core i5-3427U CPU@ 1.80GHz x 4
OS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Table C.2 Entities included within the test bench
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Code
D.1 eq_cmw500_test.robot
1 #
2 # 2018 Developed by Renault SW Labs,
3 # an affiliate of RENAULT s.a.s. which holds all intellectual property rights.
4 # Use of this software is subject to a specific license granted by Renault s.a.s.
5 #
6 *** Settings ***
7 Library eq_cmw500_test.eq_cmw500.CMW500 use_grpc=FALSE
8
9 *** Keywords ***
10 CHECKSET GPIB STATUS
11 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
12 Log To Console Checking if commtester:${equipment} is available on GPIB address:${gpib_address}
13 check if gpib available ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
14
15 SET COMMTESTER CONFIG
16 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${technology}
17 Log To Console Configuration:${technology} from YAML file will be loaded into the commtester:${equipment}
18 set configuration ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${technology}
19
20 DO COMMTESTER RECALL
21 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${file_to_recall}
22 Log To Console Found a previous file to recall. It will be loaded.
23 load recall configuration ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${file_to_recall}
24
25 CHECK INTERNET CONNECTIVITY
26 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${ping_addr} ${ct_ping_timeout}
27 Log To Console Checking Internet connectivity: will try PING from commtester:${gpib_address} to external ip address:${
ping_addr}
28 check internet connection ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${ping_addr} ${ct_ping_timeout}
29
30 CHECKSET GO TO LOCAL
31 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
32 Log To Console Returning control of commtester:${equipment} to end user in local
33 return control to end user ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
34
35 CHECK COMMTERSTER SOFTWARE VERSION
36 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
37 Log To Console Checking current software version in commtester:${equipment}
38 verify valid version ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
39
40 CHECKSET WCDMA OFF
41 [arguments] ${gpib_address}
42 Log To Console Shutting SIG 1 WCDMA down if any in RF 1 COM from comm tester
43 ${result} = shut down rf ${gpib_address}
44 [Return] ${result}
45
46 CHECKSET WCDMA ON
47 [arguments] ${gpib_address}
48 Log To Console Starting SIG 1 WCDMA in RF 1 COM from comm tester
49 ${result} = start rf ${gpib_address}
50 [Return] ${result}
51
52 CHECKSET CONNECTION CEST
53 [arguments] ${gpib_address} ${cest_timeout} ${cest_interval_in_s}
54 Log To Console Checking if the IVC’s state is CEST into the comm tester for a specific given timeout
55 ${result} = check if ivc is cest ${gpib_address} ${cest_timeout} ${cest_interval_in_s}
56 [Return] ${result}
57
58 CHECKSET COMM TESTER IP ADDRESS
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59 [arguments] ${gpib_address} ${commtester_ip_address}
60 Log To Console Verifying if comm tester’s provided ip address is correct
61 check if comm tester ip address is valid ${gpib_address} ${commtester_ip_address}
62
63 DEACTIVATE DNS
64 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
65 Log To Console Shutting down DNS
66 shut down dns ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
67
68 CHECKSET DNS
69 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${dns_target_address} ${dns_timeout}
70 Log To Console Starting the comm tester DNS, and restarting if necessary
71 start and test dns ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${dns_target_address} ${dns_timeout}
72
73 CHECKSET REBOOT DAU
74 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${wait_timer}
75 Log To Console Booting DAU: Data Application Unit
76 reboot dau ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${wait_timer}
77
78 CHECKSET UPDATE SCREEN
79 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
80 Log To Console COmm tester:${equipment} display will be kept alive
81 keep display alive ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
82
83 CHECKSET POWER MEASUREMENT
84 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${power_limit}
85 Log To Console Activate IVC’s output power measurement from comm tester
86 ${result} = activate power measurement ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${power_limit}
87 [Return] ${result}
88
89 DO POWER MEASUREMENT
90 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${target_power}
91 #Log To Console Measuring comm tester’s input power
92 ${result} = carry out power measurement ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${target_power}
93 [Return] ${result}
94
95 SET POWER VALUE
96 [arguments] ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${target_power}
97 #Log To Console Sending an output power order of ${target_power} dBm to the IVC
98 set power to the ivc ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${target_power}
99
100 CHECKSET ACTIVATE POWER SUPPLY
101 [arguments] ${yml_path} ${pw_config_name}
102 activate power supply ${yml_path} ${pw_config_name}
103
104 DO CURRENT MEASUREMENT
105 [arguments] ${yml_path} ${pw_config_name}
106 ${result} = carry out current measurement ${yml_path} ${pw_config_name}
107 [Return] ${result}
108
109 SET FREQUENCY VALUE
110 [arguments] ${gpib_address} ${operation_band} ${dl_frequency} ${ul_frequency}
111 set specific frequency to the ivc ${gpib_address} ${operation_band} ${dl_frequency} ${ul_frequency}
[69]
D. Code
D.2 udp_flood.py
1 #
2 # 2016 Developed by Ananasr (https://gist.github.com/Ananasr) and
3 # adapted/modified by L Orus on 2018. UDP flood attack.
4 #
5 import time, socket, random, sys
6
7 def usage():
8 print("Usage: " + sys.argv[0] + " <ip> <port> <second>")
9
10 def flood(victim, vport, duration):
11 # creation of server: "SOCK_DGRAM" = UDP type program, 1024 = 1B
12 client = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
13 bytes = random._urandom(1024)
14 timeout = time.time() + duration
15 sent = 0
16 print("-"*40)
17 while 1:
18 if time.time() > timeout:
19 break
20 else:
21 pass
22 client.sendto(bytes, (victim, vport))
23 sent = sent + 1
24 print("[Attack] %s ---> %s:%s"%(sent, victim, vport), end=’\r’)
25
26 def main():
27 print(len(sys.argv))
28 if len(sys.argv) != 4:
29 usage()
30 else:
31 flood(sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]), float(sys.argv[3]))
32
33 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
34 main()
D.3 TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500.robot
1 #
2 # 2019 Developed by Renault SW Labs,
3 # an affiliate of RENAULT s.a.s. which holds all intellectual property rights.
4 # Use of this software is subject to a specific license granted by Renault s.a.s.
5 #
6 *** Settings ***
7 Documentation Test to load the by-default settings in the CMW500 so we can run TC properly
8 ...
9 ... It will the initial settings to the CMW500 and will verify its connection to the Internet. If necessary,
Linux drivers will be installed.
10 ...
11 Test Setup SETUP_TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500
12 Test Teardown TEARDOWN_TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500
13 Resource ../HLK/eq_cmw500.robot
14
15 *** Variables ***
16 ${equipment} CMW500
17 ${gpib_address} 20
18 ${technology} default_3G
19 ${file_to_recall} d:\\Rohde-Schwarz\\CMW\\Data\\Save\\az02476\\cmw5002configleft.dfl
20 ${ping_addr} k.ro
21 ${ct_ping_timeout} 30
22 ${dns_target_address} www.google.es
23 ${dns_timeout} 3
24 ${wait_timer} 80
25
26 *** Test Cases ***
27 TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500
28 Log To Console ${\n}${\n}***** Begin Test Execution *****${\n}
29 CHECK COMMTERSTER SOFTWARE VERSION ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
30 DO COMMTESTER RECALL ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${file_to_recall}
31 SET COMMTESTER CONFIG ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${technology}
32 CHECKSET DNS ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${dns_target_address} ${dns_timeout}
33 CHECK INTERNET CONNECTIVITY ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${ping_addr} ${ct_ping_timeout}
34
35 *** Keywords ***
36 SETUP_TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500
37 Log To Console ${\n}***** Setup Initial Conditions *****${\n}
38 CHECKSET GPIB STATUS ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
39
40 TEARDOWN_TC_SET_DEFAULT_CONFIG_CMW500
41 Run Keyword And Ignore Error Log To Console ${\n}***** Teardown *****${\n}
42 Run Keyword And Ignore Error CHECKSET GO TO LOCAL ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
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D. Code
D.4 TC_CONNECT_IVC_TO_INTERNET.robot
1 #
2 # 2019 Developed by Renault SW Labs,
3 # an affiliate of RENAULT s.a.s. which holds all intellectual property rights.
4 # Use of this software is subject to a specific license granted by Renault s.a.s.
5 #
6 *** Settings ***
7 Documentation Test to check if the IVC’s got connection to the internet via the comm tester
8 ...
9 ... It will initially check if there’s RF connection to later check the Internet
10 ... To do so, it will access the comm tester via the GPIB command and retrieve its
11 ... RF interface IP address to check if it’s same as input target IP
12 ...
13 Test Setup SETUP_TC_CONNECT_IVC_TO_INTERNET
14 Test Teardown TEARDOWN_TC_CONNECT_IVC_TO_INTERNET
15 Resource ../HLK/vehicle_cybersec.robot
16 Resource ../HLK/eq_cmw500.robot
17
18 *** Variables ***
19 ${gpib_address} 20
20 ${commtester_ip_address} 192.168.1.16
21 ${ping_addr} k.ro
22 ${activate_firewall} TRUE
23 ${cest_timeout} 240
24 ${cest_interval_in_s} 1
25 ${interface_rf} rmnet_data5
26 ${ct_timeout} 15
27 ${can_to_deactivate} slcan0
28 ${inter_ping_time} 1
29 ${internet_address} k.ro
30 ${equipment} CMW500
31 ${nb_of_sent_pings} 1
32 ${wait_timer} 80
33 ${dns_target_address} www.google.es
34 ${dns_timeout} 15
35
36 *** Test Cases ***
37 TC_CONNECT_IVC_TO_INTERNET
38 Log To Console ${\n}${\n}***** Begin Test Execution *****${\n}
39 ${ct_result} = CHECK IVC TO COMM TESTER ${commtester_ip_address} ${interface_rf} ${ct_timeout} ${
inter_ping_time} ${nb_of_sent_pings}
40 ${internet_result} = CHECK IVC TO INTERNET ${internet_address} ${interface_rf} ${ct_timeout} ${
inter_ping_time} ${nb_of_sent_pings}
41 Log To Console ct_result:${ct_result} --- internet_result:${internet_result}
42 Run Keyword If "${ct_result}" == "-1" Log To Console ct_result == -1 --- TRUE
43 Run Keyword If "${ct_result}" != "-1" Log To Console ct_result == -1 --- FALSE
44 Run Keyword If "${internet_result}" == "-1" Log To Console internet_result == -1 --- TRUE
45 Run Keyword If "${internet_result}" != "-1" Log To Console internet_result == -1 --- FALSE
46 #Run Keyword If "${ct_result}" == "-1" or "${internet_result}" == "-1" #Si pongo ’or’, el Log To Console de despues no
funciona: 0 input arguments...wtf?
47 Run Keyword If "${internet_result}" == "-1"
48 ... Run Keywords
49 ... Log To Console ${\n}Ping did not work. Starting main approach to solve the problem${\n}
50 ... DEACTIVATE DNS ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
51 ... CHECKSET REBOOT DAU ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${wait_timer}
52 ... CHECKSET WCDMA ON ${gpib_address}
53 ... CHECKSET DNS ${equipment} ${gpib_address} ${dns_target_address} ${dns_timeout}
54 ... CHECKSET CONNECTION CEST ${gpib_address} ${cest_timeout} ${cest_interval_in_s}
55 ... CHECK IVC TO COMM TESTER ${commtester_ip_address} ${interface_rf} ${ct_timeout} ${inter_ping_time}
${nb_of_sent_pings}
56 CHECKSET FIREWALL STATUS ${interface_rf}
57
58 *** Keywords ***
59 SETUP_TC_CONNECT_IVC_TO_INTERNET
60 Log To Console ${\n}***** Setup Initial Conditions *****${\n}
61 CHECKSET UPDATE SCREEN ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
62 CHECKSET WCDMA OFF ${gpib_address}
63 CHECKSET DEACTIVATE CAN ${can_to_deactivate}
64 #DO CURRENT MEASUREMENT ${yml_path} ${pw_config_name}
65 #CHECKSET ACTIVATE POWER SUPPLY ${yml_path} ${pw_config_name}
66 CHECKSET ACTIVATE CAN
67 CHECKSET IVC STATUS AND REBOOT
68 CHECKSET WCDMA ON ${gpib_address}
69 CHECKSET CONNECTION CEST ${gpib_address} ${cest_timeout} ${cest_interval_in_s}
70 CHECKSET COMM TESTER IP ADDRESS ${gpib_address} ${commtester_ip_address}
71
72 TEARDOWN_TC_CONNECT_IVC_TO_INTERNET
73 Run Keyword And Ignore Error Log To Console ${\n}***** Teardown *****${\n}
74 Run Keyword And Ignore Error CHECKSET GO TO LOCAL ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
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D. Code
D.5 TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET.robot
1 #
2 # 2019 Developed by Renault SW Labs,
3 # an affiliate of RENAULT s.a.s. which holds all intellectual property rights.
4 # Use of this software is subject to a specific license granted by Renault s.a.s.
5 #
6 *** Settings ***
7 Documentation Test to "test" the IVC’s reliability
8 ...
9 ... It will switch the comm tester RF ON/OFF in order to measure the time to reconnection to Internet
10 ...
11 Test Setup SETUP_TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET
12 Test Teardown TEARDOWN_TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET
13 Resource ../HLK/vehicle_cybersec.robot
14 Resource ../HLK/eq_cmw500.robot
15 Library DateTime
16
17 *** Variables ***
18 ${gpib_address} 20
19 ${internet_address} k.ro
20 ${interface_rf} rmnet_data5
21 ${ct_timeout} 30
22 ${inter_ping_time} 1
23 ${nb_of_sent_pings} 1
24 ${cest_timeout} 180
25 ${cest_interval_in_s} 1
26 ${name_to_save} results/results_tc_ivc_reliability_internet
27 ${equipment} CMW500
28 ${number_of_iterations} 6000
29 ${type_of_file} ping
30 ${can_to_deactivate} slcan0
31 ${zero} 0
32 ${result} 0
33 ${error_log} ok
34
35 *** Test Cases ***
36 TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET
37 Log To Console ${\n}${\n}***** Begin Test Execution *****${\n}
38 ${initial_date} = Get Current Date result_format=%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f
39 ${initial_time} = Convert Date ${initial_date} datetime
40 CREATE NEW FILE ${name_to_save} ${initial_time} ${type_of_file}
41 :FOR ${i} IN RANGE 9999
42 \ Exit For Loop If ${i} == ${number_of_iterations}
43 \ ${iteration_index} = Evaluate ${i} + 1
44 \ ${rf_off_result} = CHECKSET WCDMA OFF ${gpib_address}
45 \ Log To Console rf_off_result:${rf_off_result}
46 \ Run Keyword If "${rf_off_result}" == "False" CHECKSET GPIB STATUS ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
47 \ CHECKSET WCDMA ON ${gpib_address}
48 \ ${error_log} Set Variable If "${rf_off_result}" == "False" ko: gpib connection lost > reboot drivers ok
49 \ Log To Console error_log:${error_log}
50 \ ${current_date_before} = Get Current Date result_format=%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f
51 \ ${time_before} = Convert Date ${current_date_before} datetime
52 \ Log To Console ${\n}----- Iteration ${iteration_index} [Start] ${time_before.hour}:${time_before.minute}:${
time_before.second} -----${\n}
53 \ ${cest_result} = CHECKSET CONNECTION CEST ${gpib_address} ${cest_timeout} ${cest_interval_in_s}
54 \ Log To Console cest_result:${cest_result}
55 \ ${result} = Evaluate ${zero} - 1
56 \ Run Keyword If "${cest_result}" == "False"
57 \ ... Run Keywords Log To Console ${\n}${\n}The IVC is not connecting automatically. Retrying...${\n} AND
CHECKSET DEACTIVATE CAN ${can_to_deactivate} AND CHECKSET ACTIVATE CAN AND CHECKSET IVC STATUS AND
REBOOT AND CHECKSET CONNECTION CEST ${gpib_address} ${cest_timeout} ${cest_interval_in_s}
58 \ ${result} = CHECK IVC TO INTERNET ${internet_address} ${interface_rf} ${ct_timeout} ${inter_ping_time
} ${nb_of_sent_pings}
59 \ ${current_date_after} = Get Current Date result_format=%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f
60 \ ${time_after} = Convert Date ${current_date_after} datetime
61 \ Log To Console ${\n}----- Iteration ${iteration_index} [Stop] ${time_after.hour}:${time_after.minute}:${
time_after.second} -----${\n}
62 \ Log To Console ${\n}result:${result}${\n}
63 \ ${time_after_timeout} = Add Time To Date ${time_before} ${cest_timeout}
64 \ ${error_log} Set Variable If
65 \ ... "${cest_result}" == "False" and "${error_log}" == "ok" ko: cest timeout of ${cest_timeout} seconds reached
> reboot ivc
66 \ ... "${cest_result}" == "True" and "${error_log}" == "ok" ok
67 \ ... "${error_log}" != "ok" ko: gpib connection lost > reboot drivers
68 \ Log To Console error_log:${error_log}
69 \ Run Keyword If "${cest_result}" == "True" SAVE TTC TO FILE ${time_before} ${time_after} ${
name_to_save} ${initial_time} ${error_log} ELSE SAVE TTC TO FILE ${time_before} ${time_after_timeout}
${name_to_save} ${initial_time} ${error_log}
70 \ ${remaining_iterations} = Evaluate ${number_of_iterations}-${iteration_index}
71 \ Log To Console ${\n}${remaining_iterations} iteration(s) remaining...${\n}
72 Log To Console Exited
73
74 *** Keywords ***
75 SETUP_TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET
76 Log To Console ${\n}***** Setup Initial Conditions *****${\n}
77
78 TEARDOWN_TC_IVC_RELIABILITY_INTERNET
79 Run Keyword And Ignore Error Log To Console ${\n}***** Teardown *****${\n}
80 Run Keyword And Ignore Error CHECKSET GO TO LOCAL ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
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D. Code
D.6 TC_CYBERSEC_TLS_MQTT_REJECTS_V10_ACCEPTS_V12.robot
1 #
2 # 2019 Developed by Renault SW Labs,
3 # an affiliate of RENAULT s.a.s. which holds all intellectual property rights.
4 # Use of this software is subject to a specific license granted by Renault s.a.s.
5 #
6 *** Settings ***
7 Documentation Test to check if the MQTT broker rejects TLSv1.0 but accepts TLSv1.2
8 ...
9 ... IVC starts TLS SYN
10 ...
11 Test Setup SETUP_TC_CYBERSEC_TLS_MQTT_REJECTS_V10_ACCEPTS_V12
12 Test Teardown TEARDOWN_TC_CYBERSEC_TLS_MQTT_REJECTS_V10_ACCEPTS_V12
13 Resource ../HLK/vehicle_cybersec.robot
14 Resource ../HLK/eq_cmw500.robot
15
16 *** Variables ***
17 ${file_name} openssl_client_logs.txt
18 ${timeout_to_mqtt} 6
19 ${interface_rf} rmnet_data5
20 ${equipment} CMW500
21 ${gpib_address} 20
22 ${ip_mqtt_avnext} 52.233.180.235
23 ${port_mqtt_avnext} 8883
24
25 *** Test Cases ***
26 TC_CYBERSEC_TLS_MQTT_REJECTS_V10_ACCEPTS_V12
27 Log To Console ${\n}${\n}***** Begin Test Execution *****${\n}
28 ${mqtt_connection_status} = CHECKSET IVC TO MQTT GMS ${timeout_to_mqtt}
29 Run Keyword If "${mqtt_connection_status}"== "True" CHECKSET IVC TO MQTT DM ${timeout_to_mqtt}
30 CHECKSET FORCE TLS CONNECTION TLSv1.0 ${ip_mqtt_avnext} ${port_mqtt_avnext} ${file_name}
31 ${mqtt_connection_status} = CHECKSET IVC TO MQTT GMS ${timeout_to_mqtt}
32 Run Keyword If "${mqtt_connection_status}"== "True" CHECKSET IVC TO MQTT DM ${timeout_to_mqtt}
33 CHECKSET FORCE TLS CONNECTION TLSv1.2 ${ip_mqtt_avnext} ${port_mqtt_avnext} ${file_name}
34 ${mqtt_connection_status} = CHECKSET IVC TO MQTT GMS ${timeout_to_mqtt}
35 Run Keyword If "${mqtt_connection_status}"== "True" CHECKSET IVC TO MQTT DM ${timeout_to_mqtt}
36
37 *** Keywords ***
38 SETUP_TC_CYBERSEC_TLS_MQTT_REJECTS_V10_ACCEPTS_V12
39 Log To Console ${\n}***** Setup Initial Conditions *****${\n}
40 ${status_of_firewall} = CHECKSET FIREWALL STATUS ${interface_rf}
41 Log To Console ${status_of_firewall}
42 Run Keyword If "${status_of_firewall}"== "False" SET IVC FIREWALL True
43 CHECK DEBUGCONSOLE IS CLOSED
44
45 TEARDOWN_TC_CYBERSEC_TLS_MQTT_REJECTS_V10_ACCEPTS_V12
46 Run Keyword And Ignore Error Log To Console ${\n}***** Teardown *****${\n}
47 Run Keyword And Ignore Error DELETE OPENSSL CLIENT LOGS ${file_name}
48 Run Keyword And Ignore Error CHECKSET GO TO LOCAL ${equipment} ${gpib_address}
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6/30/2019 TFM_ETSETB_ORUS - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZdBkAtaAlcg5OffQ9boxFY2406_3Gqbyh3otjliVtJg/edit# 69/69
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